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Oil and Water:  Mixing Individual 
Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and 
Health Reform 
 
Allison K. Hoffman† 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
The 2010 federal health insurance reform act includes an individual 
mandate that will require Americans to carry health insurance.  This article 
argues that even if the mandate were to catalyze universal health insurance 
coverage, it will fall short on some of the policy objectives many hope to achieve 
through a mandate if implemented in a fragmented insurance market.  To 
uncover this problem, this article sets forth a novel framework that 
disentangles three different policy objectives the individual mandate can serve.  
Namely, supporters of the mandate might hope for it to: (1) facilitate greater 
health and financial security for the uninsured (“paternalism”); (2) eliminate 
inefficiencies in health care delivery and financing (“efficiency”); and/or (3) 
require the healthy to buy insurance to help fund medical care for the sick 
(“health redistribution”).  Health redistribution – the primary focus of this 
article – is a shifting of wealth from the healthy to the sick through the 
mechanism of risk pooling.  Many see health redistribution as a means to 
enable all Americans to more equitably access medical care on the basis of 
need, rather than on the basis of ability or willingness to pay. 
                                                 
† Academic Fellow and Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School, Petrie-Flom Center for 
Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics.  J.D. 2004, Yale Law School.  I am very 
grateful for thoughtful comments on various drafts of this article provided by Tom Baker, 
Brietta Clark, I. Glenn Cohen, Einer Elhauge, Michael Frakes, Mark Hall, Timothy Jost, 
Gillian Lester, Kristin Madison, Anup Malani, Ted Marmor, Amy Monahan, Abigail 
Moncrieff, Christopher Robertson, Ben Roin, Bill Sage, Vicki Schultz, Jed Shugerman, Talha 
Syed, Harsha Thirumurthy, and Melissa Wasserman, as well as participants in the Petrie-Flom 
Center Health Law Policy Workshop and 2009 Academic Fellows Workshop at Harvard Law 
School.  
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Drawing on evidence from the implementation of an individual mandate 
in Massachusetts’s health reform in 2006, this article reveals that the 
fragmented American health insurance market will thwart the mandate’s 
ability to achieve these objectives— in particular the goal of health 
redistribution.  Fragmentation is an atomization of the insurance market into 
numerous risk pools that has been driven by market competition and 
regulation.  It prevents Americans from sharing broadly in the risk of poor 
health and, in doing so, entrenches a system where access to medical care 
remains tied to ability to pay and individualized characteristics.  The final 
section of this article examines how various policies, including some in the 
new law (e.g., insurance regulation and exchanges) and others not (e.g., 
expanded public insurance), can reduce fragmentation so that the mandate 
can successfully serve all desired objectives and in the process gain greater 
legitimacy over time.     
I. INTRODUCTION 
Driving the 2009-2010 federal health reform debate has been a widely-
shared desire to address the problem of an estimated 46 million uninsured 
Americans.1  At the heart of the newly enacted federal health insurance reform 
legislation (“Health Reform Law”) is an “individual mandate,” which will 
attempt to address this problem by requiring Americans to carry health 
insurance.2  
The individual mandate has been held up as the “American” way to 
achieve universal coverage, where every citizen can choose her own insurance, 
and commercial insurers can compete for profit.  By laying claims to coverage, 
choice, and competition, the mandate has garnered a strong and diverse set of 
supporters.  Hillary Clinton and John Edwards championed the individual 
                                                 
1 US Census Bureau, Current Population Reports, Income, Poverty, and Health 
Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2007 20 (2008).  Contentious efforts at health 
reform seeking universal coverage have been woven throughout 20th Century politics.  Efforts 
began in the Progressive Era, when the American Association for Labor Legislation introduced 
legislation requiring insurance for all workers.  President Franklin Roosevelt proposed 
national health insurance in 1934, but dropped it in response to resistance by medical 
professionals.  President Truman rekindled the push for national insurance in 1945, which 
resulted in Medicare and Medicaid under President Johnson in 1965.  Recently, the Clinton 
administration made a famous failed attempt at health reform in the 1990s.  See Paul Starr, 
What Happened to Health Care Reform?, 20 The American Prospect 20 (1995) (an analysis 
of the Clinton administration’s health reform failure).  For discussion of the history of health 
reform, see Tom Daschle et al., Critical: What We Can Do About the Health Care 
Crisis 49-51 (2008); Theodore R. Marmor & Jonathan Oberlander, Paths to Universal Health 
Insurance: Progressive Lessons from the Past for the Future, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev 205 (2004). 
2 On March 23, 2010, President Barak Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010), available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3590eas.txt.pdf  (last accessed Feb. 14, 
2010).  The final health reform act will almost certainly include a companion bill, The Health 
Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, H.R. 4872, which was passed by both the 
Senate and House on March 25, 2010.  At times throughout this draft, I refer to the House 
Bill, the Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 501 (2009), which 
the House passed on November 7, 2009 and was superseded by the Senate version of 
legislation that was enacted into law, available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c111:H.R.3962: (last accessed February 14, 2010).   
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1341955
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mandate during the 2008 Democratic primary race.  Former Governor of 
Massachusetts Mitt Romney, a Republican, proposed it as a key element of 
the Commonwealth’s health reform, which was enacted into law by an 
overwhelmingly Democratic legislature in 2006.3  The health insurance 
industry, historically resistant to national reform, has supported an individual 
mandate and has even offered concessions in return for inclusion of the 
mandate in legislation.   
Much attention by scholars, think tanks, and the media on the individual 
mandate has focused on whether the mandate can achieve the goal of insuring 
all Americans and at what cost.4  Proponents of the mandate argue a mandate 
is necessary to achieve universal coverage.5  Opponents say it is a very 
expensive way to pursue only modest gains in coverage at an unacceptable 
insult to individual autonomy.6   
Yet, there is no clear expression of, or consensus as to, why we would want 
to increase coverage through an individual mandate.  What would we hope to 
accomplish by requiring every American carry health insurance? 
I suggest in this article that there are three primary reasons that drive 
support for the individual mandate.  First, some people are worried about the 
                                                 
3 2006 Mass. Acts Chapter 58, An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, 
Accountable Health Care, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M, § 2 (2008) [hereinafter Chapter 58].   
4 See, e.g., Republican Study Comm., RSC Policy Brief: An Individual Mandate to 
Purchase Health Insurance 2-4 (2008); Linda Blumberg & John Holohan, Urban 
Inst., Do Individual Mandates Matter? 1-3 (2008); Sherry A. Glied et al., Consider It 
Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612, 1615 
(2007); Jonathan Gruber, Covering the Uninsured in the U.S., 46 J. Econ. Lit. 571, 601 
(2008) (analyzing approaches to health reform and making budgetary efficiency targeting 
argument for mandates); David A. Hyman, The Massachusetts Health Plan; The Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1103, 1111 (2006);  Peter D. Jacobson & Rebecca L. Braun, 
Let 1000 Flowers Wilt: The Futility of State-Level Health Care Reform, 55 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1173 
(2007) (summarizing past state efforts at reform with an emphasis on discussion of individual 
and employer mandates); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Massachusetts Health Plan: Public 
Insurance for the Poor, Private Insurance for the Wealthy, Self-Insurance for the Rest, 55 U. 
Kan. L. Rev. 1091 (2007) (arguing that the MA plan results in three tiers of health insurance); 
Alan B. Krueger & Uwe E. Reinhardt, The Economics of Employer Versus Individual 
Mandates, 13(2) Health Aff. 34, 40 (1994); C. Eugene Steuerle, Implementing Employer and 
Individual Mandates, 13(2) Health Aff. 54 (1994) (discussing administrative challenges in 
terms of collection and enforcement); Michael Tanner, Cato Inst., Individual Mandates 
for Health Insurance: Slippery Slope to National Health Care (2006); Glen 
Whitman, Hazards of the Individual Health Care Mandate, Cato Policy Report, Sept./Oct. 
2007, at 1 (outlining potential adverse effects on policy and benefit design and on free riding); 
Sherry Glied, Mandates and the Affordability of Health Care (Economic Research Initiative on 
the Uninsured Working Paper Series, Paper No. 59, 2008) (describing the economics of the 
affordability exemption); Jonathan Cohn, Mandate Overboard, The New Republic (Dec. 7, 
2007), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/mandate-overboard; Einer Elhauge, Coverage v. 
Coercion, Huffington Post (Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/einer-
elhauge/coverage-v-coercion_b_89686.html (questioning whether coercion of mandates is 
validated by effect on free rider problem); Jonathan Gruber et al., New America 
Foundation, Health Debate Reality Check: The Role of Individual Requirements 
(2007), 
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8824/Health%20Debate%20Reality
%20Check.pdf. 
5 See, e.g., Blumberg & Holohan, supra note 4; Gruber, supra note 4; Gruber et al., 
supra note 4.  
6 See, e.g., Republican Study Comm., supra note 4; Tanner, supra note 4; Whitman, 
supra note 4.  
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wellbeing of the uninsured themselves, motivated by the uninsured individual 
whose cancer or heart disease will go undiagnosed and lead to premature 
death or, if diagnosed, will cause him to choose between his financial and 
physical wellbeing because of the high costs of his medical care.  Validating 
such concerns, a recent report by Harvard researchers reports lack of health 
insurance is associated with 45,000 deaths a year in the United States.7   
Alternatively, some are interested in their own bottom line, angry that the 
uninsured don’t “pay their share,” making insurance more expensive for 
everyone else.  Their support for the mandate is animated by the stories of the 
28 year-old who decided he was healthy enough to “go bare” without 
insurance coverage and then has a mountain biking accident that results in 
tens of thousands of dollars of emergency room care he can’t afford.     
Others struggle morally with the fact that nearly 1/5 of all Americans lack 
insurance, particularly if they are poor or sick, and what such a reality says 
about us as a nation of people.8  They want to ensure that we create a system 
that enables all members of their community – locally and nationally – to have 
equitable access to good medical care when in need. 
In this article, I contend that by failing to look closely at these different 
objectives and what it would take to achieve them, policy debates about the 
individual mandate have obscured the fact that even if the mandate were to 
lead to 100 percent coverage, it could fail to achieve what many people 
envision and hope it to do.  By untangling the different policy objectives 
supporters intend an individual mandate to serve, it becomes clear that the 
mandate will face serious barriers to success in our current “fragmented” 
health insurance markets, by which I mean insurance markets that divide 
people and groups up on the basis of risk. 
This article tells the story of the individual mandate and fragmentation in 
three parts.  First, it sets forth a novel framework to examine the three 
objectives an individual mandate can serve – which I characterize as 
paternalism, efficiency, and health redistribution – that each justify use of a 
mandate for some of its supporters.  Second, it brings past research on 
fragmentation of health insurance markets, often discussed within the realm 
of economics, into the legal and policy debate to define and shine a light on 
the critical problems fragmentation will cause for implementation of a 
mandate, particularly with respect to the goal of health redistribution.9  
Finally, it considers how policy solutions, including prohibition of risk 
selection in the private market or creation of public insurance alternatives, 
could ameliorate fragmentation and perhaps in doing so also enhance the 
long-term political legitimacy of an individual mandate.      
As context for this story of the challenges the individual mandate will face 
in a fragmented market, Part II describes how the individual mandate differs 
                                                 
7 Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in U.S. Adults, 99 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 2289, 2292 (2009).    
8  U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 1, at 23. 
9 Fragmentation is present in different forms throughout the system of health care 
delivery and financing and thus has received, in one form or another, considerable attention 
from scholars.  See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, The Fragmentation of U.S. Health Care: 
Causes and Solutions (forthcoming 2010); Nan Hunter, Risk Governance and Deliberative 
Democracy in Health Care, 97 Geo. L.J. 1, 17-27 (2008) (discussion of health law as a field of 
risk-centered governance).  
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from the policy approaches other industrialized countries have taken toward 
the goal of universal coverage.  It also explores the mechanism by which the 
individual mandate works and how it can affect the uninsured as both 
consumers of insurance and (for some) as “financiers,” who will pay more for 
premiums than they consume in care and thus help finance medical care for 
others.  This second influence supports the mandate’s ability to affect 
distributive goals. 
Part III detangles how an individual mandate can serve three different 
policy objectives.  It describes how some support the mandate for paternalistic 
reasons; their objective is that all Americans have insurance that protects 
them from poor health and financial insecurity.  Others, including many of 
the health economists defining the health reform policy elements, see the 
mandate as a tool to reduce inefficient use of care by the uninsured or to 
promote more efficient health insurance markets by addressing the problem 
of adverse selection.  Finally – and the primary focus of this paper – some 
support the mandate for redistributive reasons so that the risk of poor health 
is shouldered more equally by all Americans.   
The mandate promotes such redistribution by requiring the uninsured 
who have arguably rationally opted out of the insurance market (because they 
are healthy and unlikely to need medical care) to buy health insurance 
nonetheless to finance care for those sicker or less lucky than themselves.  
When the healthy and the sick pool risk, it creates a redistribution of wealth 
from the healthy to the sick, which I call “health redistribution" in contrast to 
“income redistribution,” whereby wealthy are taxed to provide health care for 
the poor (e.g., in Medicaid).   
Advocates of expanding health insurance coverage, in general, and of the 
individual mandate, in particular, have explored political, pragmatic, and 
moral benefits of health redistribution that I discuss in Part III.C below.  They 
argue, for example, that health redistribution enhances the political feasibility 
of funding subsidies for insurance coverage for the poor and sick, by 
facilitating subsidies within the bounds of a defined program and among a 
broader base, thus avoiding the sharp division between haves and have-nots 
created by income tax-based subsidies.10  Scholars also have argued health 
redistribution might address distributive justice concerns with less labor 
distortion than an income tax might.11  Effective health redistribution might 
also unlock greater insurance market efficiency by reducing practices of 
medical underwriting and risk selection.   
Finally, I show that some scholars see health redistribution as a means to 
institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of health insurance in the U.S., 
where access to health care can be divorced from market forces or individual 
wealth.12  In other words, for some, implementing an individual mandate 
                                                 
10 See infra Part III.C. 
11 Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449, 1455 (1994). 
12 For examinations of health and solidarity, see Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, 
Embracing Risk, in Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and 
Responsibility 1, 6 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Tom Baker, Risk, Insurance, 
and the Social Construction of Responsibility, in Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture 
of Insurance and Responsibility 33, 47 (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Mary 
Crossley, Discrimination Against the Unhealthy in Health Insurance, 54 U. Kan. L. Rev 73, 
73 (2005); Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of the Health 
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would be tantamount to asking Americans to act collectively so that everyone 
– rich, poor, sick, or healthy – can access medical care when in need, 
regardless of income or health status.  This notion of health solidarity has 
deep roots in health care provision historically in the U.S., through mutual aid 
societies and religious organizations, and is a central attribute of health care 
in all other advanced nations.13  I explore whether a mandate that affects 
health redistribution might indeed not only institutionalize a more solidaristic 
form of insurance but, perhaps in the long term, help to generate popular and 
political support for a more solidaristic system of insurance.14    
Yet, in Part IV, I contend that the individual mandate will not be able to 
realize such benefits that rely upon its ability to promote health redistribution 
if it is implemented in a fragmented health insurance market.  Fragmentation 
is an atomization of the health insurance market into numerous risk pools – a 
complex process that has been fueled by private market competition and 
exacerbated by regulation in both intentional and unintentional ways.  
Commercial insurers’ profit relies upon their ability to segment people into 
groups of predictable or similar risk and price according to risk or to select out 
good risks (i.e., cherry picking).  To better manage risk and profit, insurers 
have carved up the insurance market into submarkets – large group, small 
group, and individual.  Risk is not pooled among these three markets.  This 
means that if healthy individuals are disproportionately insured in one market 
and sick in another, they don’t share in risk and medical costs.  Furthermore, 
in the individual market (and somewhat the small group market), risk pooling 
may be limited among individual insureds to the extent insurers are permitted 
under state law to design premiums and coverage based on projections of 
individual risk.15  One often examined driver of fragmentation, for example, is 
                                                                                                                      
Care System on the Health of America, 39 St. Louis U. L. J. 7, 9 (1994); Sharona Hoffman, 
Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Coverage, 78 Ind. L. J. 659, 668 (2003); 
Hunter, supra note 9, at 48-50 (promoting health solidarity within the workplace by creating 
a system of deliberative democracy to manage employer sponsored plans and increase citizens’ 
ability to “infuse risk allocation discourse with moral values”); John V. Jacobi, The Ends of 
Health Insurance, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 311, 363-66 (1997); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Health 
Care Access in the United States: Conflicting Concepts of Justice and Little Solidarity, 27 Med. 
& L. 605, 605-07 (2008); Wendy Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in 
Health Reform, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 199, 201-03 (2008); Amy Monahan, Health Insurance Risk 
Pool and Social Solidarity: A Response to Professor David Hyman, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 325, 
325-26 (2008); Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 Health Matrix 155, 
155 (2004); Anja Rudiger, From Market Competition to Solidarity? Assessing the Prospects of 
U.S. Health Care Reform Plans from a Human Rights Perspective, 10 Health and Hum. Rts. 
123, 125-27 (2008); Deborah Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. 
Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 287, 290-92 (1993) (describing the history of solidarity and health).   
13 See Kieke Okma, Nat’l Acad. of Soc. Insur., Recent Changes in Dutch Health 
Insurance:  Individual Mandate or Social Insurance? 6-7 (2009), available at 
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/okma.pdf; Richard B. Saltman & Hans. F.W. Dubois, The 
Historical and Social Base of Social Health Insurance Systems, in Social Health Insurance 
Systems in Western Europe 21, 29, (Richard B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004); Stone, supra 
note 12, at 291. 
14 See infra note 196 for studies and articles that explore conditions that generate mutual 
aid.   
15 Some states have enacted laws that in essence require risk pooling through community 
rating, rate bands, mandated benefits or guaranteed issue of insurance.  See discussion infra 
note 228.  Cf. Economists Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring have shown evidence that there 
may be some risk pooling in the individual market even in unregulated states.  See discussion 
infra note 231. 
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risk classification and selection practices used by private insurers.16  By 
creating such crevasses that limit the scope of risk pooling, fragmentation 
makes it impossible to distribute costs of poor health broadly among both 
healthy and sick, even as the mandate compels more healthy people join risk 
pools.    
Channeling an individual mandate through this fragmented insurance 
infrastructure may prove counterproductive.  First, for some, the purpose of 
compelling the healthy to buy insurance is in part so they help fund care for 
the sick.  Participation by healthy Americans is futile when the healthy and 
sick don’t pool risk with each other.  Further, if poorer and sicker Americans 
must bear more of the cost of their own risk, they may have a harder time 
affording necessary medical care – a result antithetical to what many hope to 
achieve with an individual mandate.   
To illustrate this story of the thorny interplay between the individual 
mandate and fragmented markets, this article draws from evidence from the 
2006 health reform in Massachusetts that requires most Massachusetts 
residents over 18 to carry health insurance.17  The Massachusetts individual 
mandate significantly increased insurance coverage levels in the state18 and 
has been increasingly popular,19 yet simultaneously exhibits the challenges an 
individual mandate will face if implemented in a fragmented insurance 
market.  Although Massachusetts has made some strides to address 
fragmentation, implementing many of the same policies that are included in 
the federal Health Reform Law, remaining fragmentation contributes to 
problems such as exemption of some residents from the mandate on 
“affordability” grounds and variable quality of coverage among the insured.20   
Fragmentation is not an easy problem to fix.  The most elegant solution 
may be a single payer system designed to completely eliminate fragmentation.  
However, a single payer model has not been contemplated as part of current 
federal reform efforts, and most would say is politically unlikely in the near 
term.  Thus, while recognizing its benefits, I focus in Part V on evaluating 
solutions that may prove more politically feasible in the near term because of 
compatibility with preservation of private insurance markets.  I consider both 
elements that have been enacted as part of the Health Reform Law (e.g., 
regulation of private insurers and creation of exchanges for the sale of 
                                                 
16 E.g., Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 517, 
517 (1983); Baker, supra note 12, at 33-35; Donald Light, The Practice and Ethics of Risk-
Rated Health Insurance, 267 JAMA 2503, 2503-05 (1992).  See Jonathan Simon, The 
Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 22 L. & Soc. Rev. 771, 772-73 (1988); Stone, supra 
note 12, at 292-95. 
17 Chapter 58, supra note 3.   
18 Prior to reform, ~10% of the Massachusetts population was uninsured (650,000).  
Recent estimates are that 2.6% remain uninsured.  Sharon K. Long & Mindy Cohen, The 
Urban Inst., Getting Ready for Reform:  Insurance Coverage and Access to Use of 
Care in Massachusetts in Fall 2006 2-3 (2006); Sharon K. Long et al., The Urban 
Inst. & The Mass. Div. of Health Care Finance and Pol’y, Estimates of the 
Uninsurance Rate in Massachusetts from Survey Data: Why Are They So Different? 
9 (2008).   
19 Robert J. Blendon et al., Massachusetts Health Reform: A Public Perspective from 
Debate Through Implementation, 27 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w556, w558 (2008), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/27/6/w556.   
20 See, e.g., Jost, supra note 4. 
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insurance) and also elements that are not part of this initial reform but could 
be pursued, consistent with the shape of the new Law, over the coming years 
to further address fragmentation as the law is implemented.  Finally, I posit 
whether softening the current, finely-drawn boundaries of insurance markets 
and programs might not only reduce fragmentation but begin to shape a 
broader public and political interest in programs that rely upon health 
redistribution to increase equitable access to medical care.      
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE, THE UNINSURED, AND INSURANCE  
A. Models of Universal Coverage and the Individual Mandate 
Most industrialized countries treat health insurance as social insurance, 
where people contribute toward financing based on ability to pay, where risk 
of poor health is pooled broadly, and where access to care is provided on the 
basis of need.21  It is often remarked that many of these countries achieve 
health outcomes equal to or better than the United States at lower costs per 
person.22   
These countries have relied upon several different models to achieve 
universal coverage, which differ based upon the role of public and private 
entities in the financing, purchasing, and delivery of care.  For example, in 
some countries, the government finances health care through tax revenue.  
Such a model might leave the production of the medical care primarily to a 
mix of public and private entities (e.g., Canada, United States Medicare).  Or 
in system of socialized medicine, such as in the British National Health 
Service or the Veterans Administration in the United States, the government 
both finances care and also controls the delivery of care (i.e., owns hospitals 
and pays physician salaries).23  Government-financed and owned medical care 
is often called a Beveridge system, after Lord Beveridge, who designed the 
British health system after World War II.24 
A competing model of social insurance system relies not on the state but 
rather upon highly-regulated private entities (for-profit and non-profit) to 
administer compulsory health insurance; these entities are sometimes called 
sickness funds and are often organized by profession, region, or religion and 
funded through targeted funding, often separate from general tax revenue.25  
                                                 
21 Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Disentitlement? 14-15 (2003).  See Posting of Uwe. E. 
Reinhardt to N.Y. Times Economix Blog, Health Reform Without a Public Plan: The German 
Model, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/health-reform-without-a-public-
plan-the-german-model (April 17, 2009, 07:02 EST). 
22 Congressional Research Service, U.S. Health Care Spending: Comparison with 
other OECD Countries 50-51 (2007), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34175_20070917.pdf; Jost, supra note 21, at 3. 
23 See Jost, supra note 21, at 204-34; Posting of Uwe E. Reinhardt to N.Y. Times 
Economix Blog, What is ‘Socialized Medicine’? A Taxonomy of Health Care Systems, 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/what-is-socialized-medicine-a-taxonomy-of-
health-care-systems/ (May 8, 2009,  06:48 EST). 
24 Jost, supra note 21, at 235; Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Why Can’t We Do What They Do? 
National Health Reform Abroad, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 443, 443 (2004).   
25 Richard B. Saltman, Social Health Insurance in Perspective: The Challenge of 
Sustaining Stability, in Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 3 (Richard 
B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004); JOST, supra note 21, at 235-264. 
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Origins of this model of health insurance are often attributed to Germany, 
which legislated mandatory (for some), state-supervised sickness funds in 
1883, under Chancellor Otto von Bismark, to seize power from Marxist-
influenced labor unions.26  But its roots reach back further to medieval guilds, 
churches, and, later, unions that collectivized financing of medical care for 
members.27  Although this model of social insurance often incorporates 
individual choice of provider and sickness funds, it differs from commercial 
insurance in that it is designed to achieve social ends and, in particular, to be 
redistributive in nature (across ages, health status, income, and individuals 
and families).28  Richard Saltman describes this model as “the administrative 
embodiment of a set of values deeply rooted in the society as a whole … and 
grounded in the historically generated principles of collective responsibility 
and social solidarity.”29  In many systems that follow this model, the 
government still plays an active role in financing, by determining premium 
costs and providing subsidies for the poor, even if purchasing is delegated to 
insurers or sickness funds.  More recently, some countries – including 
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland – have introduced some level of 
competition between funds or insurers for enrollees.30  Even though the 
competition occurs within a highly regulated environment to preserve the 
goals of social insurance,31 some are concerned that competition has led to 
rising costs and increased risk selection and might undermine the foundation 
of social insurance within these countries’ systems.32   
  Current discussions of reform in the United States have not seriously 
considered a centrally-financed insurance model (often referred to as “single 
payer”).  In fact, even mention of such an approach has historically proven to 
be a political lightning rod in the United States, provoking claims of 
“socialized medicine” (often inaccurate since centralized financing can exist 
with private delivery of medical care) and anti-reform media that quickly 
quashes reform efforts.33   
Instead, 2009 reform efforts and the resultant Health Reform Law 
envision using government mandates to achieve universal coverage without 
fundamentally restructuring the existing payment and delivery systems.  The 
proposed reform does not fundamentally change the primarily private delivery 
                                                 
26 Saltman, supra note 25 at 21-23.   
27 Id. at 27.   
28 Id. at 5.   
29 Saltman, supra note 25, at 6. 
30 E.g., Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Experience of Switzerland and the Netherlands with 
Individual Health 
Insurance Mandates: A Model for the United States? 1, 
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Faculty/Jost%20The%20Experience%20of%20Switzerland%
20and%20the%20Netherlands.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2010); Robert E. Leu et al., The 
Commonwealth Fund, The Swiss and Dutch Health Insurance Systems: Universal 
Coverage and Regulated Competitive Insurance Markets 8-11 (2009); Okma, supra 
note 13, at 4-7. 
31 Anna Dixon et al., Solidarity and Comptetition in Social Health Insurance Countries, in 
Social Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 170, 170-71, 174-76 (Richard B. 
Saltman et al. eds., 2004). 
32 Id. at 176-77; see also Jost, supra note 30. 
33 See, e.g., Daschle et al., supra note 1, at 49, 53, 78; Reinhardt, supra note 23. 
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of health care and mix of public and private financing.34  The government’s 
overarching role in reform is simply as a catalyst.  The contemplated approach 
would create a system that looks more like that in Germany, Switzerland, or 
the Netherlands, where participation is compulsory, and insurance is 
administered by private entities and funded through a mix of public and 
private sources.  Yet the United States is building on a framework of 
actuarially-rated commercial insurance, whose end goal is profit, rather than 
on a system of social insurance directed toward the goals of collective benefit 
and universal access to care.  This contradiction complicates the use of the 
mandate in the U.S., as explored below. 
There are several different types of mandates that the government could 
rely on to expand coverage.  One such mandate could require all employers 
provide or subsidize insurance coverage for employees; currently, U.S. 
employers have no such obligation.35  This type of “employer mandate” was 
included in the Clinton reform proposals, is part of the Massachusetts health 
reform of 2006, and is included in a light version in the Health Reform Law.  
Alternately, the government might mandate that insurers include certain 
people or conditions within their health plans (a “mandated benefit”).  While I 
will discuss the impact of both of these types of mandates in Part IV below, 
neither of these is the primary subject of this article. 
The focus of this article is the “individual mandate” that requires 
Americans to carry health insurance and is a cornerstone of the Health 
Reform Law.36  Individual mandates can be distinguished from other 
mandates such as employer mandates or insurer mandates based upon their 
mechanism for compliance – individual action.   We have seen individual 
mandates that require drivers hold motor vehicle insurance, parents vaccinate 
children against contagious diseases, motorists wear seatbelts, and 18-year-
old men register for the draft.  A legal mandate compels each individual to use 
his or her own resources (money and/or time) in a way he or she might not 
without government intervention.  In the case of health insurance, the 
individual mandate will require Americans to navigate the current patchwork 
of public and private coverage options to obtain coverage.   
The individual mandate is intriguing in part because it blurs distinctions 
between social and commercial insurance.  The defining characteristic of this 
                                                 
34 Professor Ted Marmor describes how Americans’ schizophrenia toward health care 
entitlement has resulted in five “Americas.”  First, the VA is socialized medicine, where 
because of veterans’ sacrifice, we provide comprehensive, specialized benefits.  Second, in 
Medicare Part A or disability coverage, contributory financing during the working life offers 
later protection against financial threats to well-being resulting from poor health; there is no 
connection between proportional/progressive financing and later distribution of benefits.  
Third, Medicaid is a means-tested program akin to European poor law.  Fourth, in 
employment-related private insurance, the insured pay directly for the benefits you receive.  
Fifth, we provide some charity care at the individual level, which we have required with 
respect to emergency care under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA).  Cf. Theodore R. Marmor et al., America’s Misunderstood Welfare State 
22-31 (BasicBooks 1990). 
35 Some states have tried to impose a participation requirement on employers through 
“pay or play,” requiring employer contribution to its employees’ coverage or payment of a 
penalty to the state.  The legality of such laws, which face risk of preemption under the federal 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), will possibly be determined by the 
Supreme Court this session. I discuss employer mandates further in Part IV below.  
36 H.R. 3590, supra note 2. 
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approach to expanding coverage by individual mandate is that it largely leaves 
the current structures of the commercial insurance market intact, while 
requiring more people to participate in it.37  Yet, the mandate is intended to 
achieve policy goals typically pursued through social insurance.  Ensuing 
conflict between the policy goals of the mandate and commercial health 
insurance forms much of the basis of discussion in Part III below about 
impediments fragmentation pose for the individual mandate.  
B. The Fragmented American Health Insurance Market 
The individual mandate will channel the uninsured into what has become 
a fragmented American health insurance market.  Fragmentation is a word 
often used to characterize American health care, describing the 
decentralization of decision makers, payers, providers, or regulation.38  In this 
article, I use the term fragmented to describe the splintering of insurance 
markets into smaller parts to divide people and groups up on the basis of risk.  
Insurance markets have become atomized into smaller sub-markets in the 
name of managing and avoiding risk.  This process of insurance market 
fragmentation has reduced the breadth of risk pooling and lays the 
groundwork for inequities among markets and insureds.  I provide a brief 
overview of the end result here.  In Part IV, I examine in greater depth how 
fragmentation has occurred, through both competition and regulation, and 
why it creates critical problems for the individual mandate.   
The primary divide in American health insurance is between public and 
private insurance with public insurance often covering more high-risk 
enrollees.39  Roughly 100 million Americans have publically-subsidized 
insurance, including the elderly, poor, disabled, and veterans, each group in a 
discrete public program.40  Public health insurance mimics some goals of 
social insurance and accounts for nearly 50 percent of all health spending in 
the country but is by no measure a cohesive system.41   
Medicaid, which is the largest program, currently insures about 61 million 
low-income or disabled beneficiaries through both state and federal funds.42  
Medicare covers 45 million elderly or disabled.43  Other public programs 
provide benefits for children whose families’ incomes are too high for 
Medicaid (State Children’s Health Insurance Program, “SCHIP”), American 
                                                 
37 It is likely, of course, that any policy built upon an individual mandate will impose a 
number of additional regulations on commercial insurers.  Such regulations are discussed in 
Part V below. 
38 See Elhauge, supra note 9. 
39 Cf. Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One Easy Lesson, 36 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 652-53 (2008). 
40 For a description of this patchwork, see Daschle et al., supra note 1, at 29-38.  
41 Susan Jaffe, Health Policy Brief: A Public Health Insurance Plan 2 (2009), 
available at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_4.pdf. 
42 Id. 
43 Medicare covered thirty-eight million people aged sixty-five and older and seven 
million people under sixty-five with disabilities in 2008.  The Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Found., Medicare: A Primer 1 (2009), http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf 
[hereinafter KFF Medicare: A Primer].   
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Indians and Alaskan Natives (Indian Health Services, “”is") and the military 
and veterans (“CHAMPUS” and “TRICARE”).    
The rest of the insured (~150 million) are covered by private insurance, 
which is divided loosely into three markets – large group (which is itself 
divided into fully and self-funded insurance, as described below), small group, 
and individual.  Health insurance is sold differently in each of these three 
markets, and, for the most part, carriers who sell insurance operate in only 
one of these three markets.44  Furthermore, as discussed below, the health 
insurance market is regulated at the state level, and the number and type of 
carriers differ state-by-state.  
The majority of privately insured Americans still obtain their health 
insurance coverage through an employer, even as the prominence of 
employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”) declines.45  ESI is carved up into large 
group and small group insurance (2-50 employees).   Large group plans can 
be “fully insured,” where an insurer bears risk under the plan.  This means 
that an employer pays the insurer premiums, and if medical costs for the year 
exceed premiums, the insurer is at risk for such losses.46  In contrast, some 
large employers have “self-funded” plans, where they bear the risk 
themselves.47  They create a reserve for medical claims, design and administer 
a coverage plan, with the help, usually, of an insurer as a third-party 
administrator (“TPA”), and then pay for medical losses under the plan out of 
the reserve.  
The frequency of self-funded health plans has increased dramatically over 
the past two decades, so that now 55 percent of covered workers (over 30 
percent of the total non-elderly population) are members of self-funded plans, 
for reasons discussed in Part IV below.48  Each self-funded plan acts as an 
isolated risk pool, extracting its members from larger insurance risk pools.  
A small, but not insignificant, number of people (6-7 percent of the non-
elderly) obtain insurance directly through the individual market, which is 
typically considered more unstable and more expensive dollar-per-dollar, as 
discussed further in Part IV.49   
The remaining 16-17 percent of the total non-elderly population is 
uninsured.50  Under an individual mandate, the uninsured could seek 
                                                 
44 Katherine Swartz, Justifying Government as the Backstop in Health Insurance Markets, 
2 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 89, 95-96 (2001). 
45 Id. at 94.  Sixty percent of all firms offer health benefits, down from a recent high of 
69% in 2000.  Kaiser Family Found. et al., Employer Health Benefits: 2007 Annual 
Survey 36 (2007), http://www.kff.org/insurance/7672/upload/76723.pdf [hereinafter KFF 
Employer Health Benefits: 2007]. 
46 In reality, most insurers buy reinsurance policies that limit their exposure. 
47 If at the end of the year, employee health costs are higher than the reserve, the company 
must cover these costs.  If employee health costs are lower than projected, the company retains 
the surplus in the plan.  See infra Part B (explaining how ERISA preemption rules have 
created incentives for employers to self insure).    
48 KFF Employer Health Benefits: 2007, supra note 45, at 147. 
49 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Health Insurance Coverage in America: 
2007 1 (2007), 
http://facts.kff.org/chartbooks/Health%20Insurance%20Coverage%20in%20America,%2020
07.pdf  [hereinafter KFF Health Insurance Coverage in America].   
50 Id.    
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coverage through any of these sub-markets, as they have done in 
Massachusetts following the 2006 reform.51 
C. The Uninsured as Consumers and Financiers 
The individual mandate could inject into this fragmented market some 46 
million uninsured, and in doing so it will influence these uninsured in two 
ways.52  The first influence, which has been well-explored, is that the mandate 
converts all uninsured to policyholders (or consumers) of insurance.  The 
second, less-examined influence is that the mandate causes some uninsured to 
pay more for insurance than they spend in care.  By so doing, it converts them 
into “financiers” of others’ care, which is critical to the mandate’s ability to 
achieve redistributive objectives and to promote solidarity. 
An understanding of why people are uninsured helps bring these two 
distinct influences to light.53  Many of the uninsured are lower-income 
workers for whom insurance is arguably “unaffordable” or unattainable.54  
Over 60 percent of the uninsured earn less than 200 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL).55  An estimated 25 percent of the uninsured qualify for 
Medicaid or SCHIP but have not enrolled.56  Some, eligible for insurance 
through the individual market, may have previously been rejected for 
coverage.57  For this part of the population, the concern is making insurance 
policies accessible and almost certainly subsidizing the purchase of such 
policies. 
Yet as many as a third of the uninsured could in theory afford to buy 
insurance but are nonetheless uninsured.  Studies estimate as many as 17 
million uninsured Americans are such “voluntary opt-outs.” 58  This segment of 
the uninsured is growing faster than the low-income uninsured.59   
                                                 
51 See infra Part V.B. 
52 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., The Uninsured, A Primer: Key Facts About 
Americans Without Insurance 1 (2009), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7451-
05.pdf [hereinafter KFF The Uninsured]. 
53 For an overview of problems of uninsurance and underinsurance, see Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost, Health Care at Risk 1-16 (Duke Univ. Press 2007).  For a study on the 
duration of being uninsured for different populations, see Pamela Farley Short & Deborah R. 
Graefe, Battery-Powered Health Insurance? Stability in Coverage of the Uninsured, 22 
Health Aff. 244, 250-51 (2003) (finding that the wealthy tend to be uninsured for shorter 
period of time and less frequently).   
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 250. 
56 The reasons for not having enrolled are varied, including lack of awareness of the 
programs and their eligibility criteria and cumbersome enrollment procedures.  John 
Holahan et al., Kaiser Comm. on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Characteristics of 
the Uninsured: Who is Eligible for Public Coverage and Who Needs Help 
Affording Coverage? 1, 6 (2007), http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7613.pdf.  
57 Sara R. Collins et al., The Commonwealth Fund, Squeezed: Why Rising 
Exposure to Health Care Costs Threatens the Health and Financial Well-Being of 
American Families 4 (2006), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2006/Sep/
Squeezed%20%20Why%20Rising%20Exposure%20to%20Health%20Care%20Costs%20Thr
eatens%20the%20Health%20and%20Financial%20Well%20Being%20of/Collins_squeezedri
singhltcarecosts_953%20pdf.pdf. 
58 The Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Understanding the 
Uninsured And what to Do About Them 5 (2007), 
http://www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/UnderstandingTheUninsured0307.pdf 
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These voluntary opt-outs have made a decision not to purchase insurance, 
presumably because they perceive the cost to be higher than the benefits.60  
Their choice may reflect a legitimate trade-off between health insurance and 
other needs they deem more important (relatively high costs).  For others, it 
may be rooted in a perception that they don’t need insurance (relatively low 
benefits).  For the young uninsured, this way of thinking prompted the 
nickname “invincibles.”  If invincibles are seen as making an irrational 
decision not to purchase insurance, paternalism may be a particularly 
important reason for a mandate, as discussed below.  But many voluntary opt-
outs could rationally decline insurance because premiums exceed the value of 
insurance to them individually, in which case paternalism cannot argue for 
compelling them to buy insurance.    
Considering this dichotomy of uninsured (involuntary vs. voluntary), we 
can see how the mandate influences the uninsured in two distinct ways – first 
as potential consumers and second as potential financiers of health care.   
First, the mandate, by definition, attempts to convert each of the 46 
million uninsured from a non-consumer into a consumer of health insurance; 
this fact underlies strong insurance industry support of both the mandate and 
also of high penalties for noncompliance.61  This goal is simply that everyone 
carries health insurance, regardless of the form of insurance or who pays for 
it.  A non-consumer might become a consumer by enrolling in coverage 
available through a public source (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid), if eligible, 
through an employer’s health plan, or on their own in the individual market.  
Further, they might pay for all, part, or none of the cost of their plan, 
depending on what level of public or employer subsidies is available.     
Second, and importantly, for a subset of the uninsured population, the 
government also compels them to be financiers of health care.  While this 
aspect of the mandate has gone largely unexamined, it is critically important 
to redistributive objectives for the mandate as discussed in Part II.  
When the mandate compels the 17 million voluntary opt-outs to buy 
insurance, they not only become consumers of health insurance, many will 
also become financiers of health care for others.  Many voluntary opt-outs 
currently make decision not to buy health insurance based on low expected 
medical costs, at least in the short-term.  To the extent their expectations are 
correct, when the mandate requires them to buy insurance, many are likely to 
                                                                                                                      
[hereinafter CAHI Understanding the Uninsured].  Recent estimates suggest that “young 
invincibles,” who comprise a large part of the voluntary opt-outs, were 13.2 million in 2007.  
Cara Buckley, For Uninsured Young Adults, Do-It-Yourself Medical Care, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 
2009, at A1 (citing the Commonwealth Fund study).   
59 CAHI Understanding the Uninsured, supra note 58, at 5.    
60 These opt outs might either have decided not to purchase insurance on their own or 
may have declined an offer of employer-sponsored insurance. Take up rates on employer-
sponsored insurance are 82%.  The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. et al., Employer 
Health Benefits: 2008 Annual Survey 47, available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/7790.pdf  
[hereinafter KFF Employer Health Benefits: 2008].  
61 America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP), the insurance lobby, and the Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Association have advocated for an individual mandate.  See Press Release, 
America’s Health Insurance Plans, America’s Health Ins. Plans, Health Plans Propose 
Guaranteed Coverage for Pre-Existing Conditions and Individual Coverage Mandate (Nov. 19, 
2008), available at  http://www.ahip.org/content/pressrelease.aspx?docid=25068; Robert 
Pear, Insurers Offer to Soften a Key Rate-Setting Policy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 2009 at B1.  
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pay premiums in an amount greater than what they consume in care (plus 
administrative expenses and profit). 62  When this occurs, some part of their 
premium payment will pay for someone else’s medical expenses.  Mandating 
these uninsured, the “financiers,” to purchase insurance cannot be for 
paternalist reasons because such purchase is in fact not in their own 
individual best interest.  Rather, as explained in Part III, the mandate’s 
influence over the financiers is central to redistributive objectives and can, by 
promoting redistribution, also unlock greater insurance market efficiency. 
Any surplus that the voluntary opt-outs pay in premiums over expenses is 
the contribution they make as financiers of health care.  Because they are 
healthy (rich in terms of the resource of health), they are compelled to 
bankroll care for people sicker than themselves.  This investment may pay 
back in a year when they are sick and consume more care than what they pay 
in premiums, or it may not.   
While I use the term “financier” to describe these net contributors, I do so 
with a sense of irony and caution.  Economist Jon Gruber notes that we 
understand very little about this population.63  Yet, it is clear that we would 
not consider many “financiers” rich.  They are often young and just beginning 
their careers or at an income level where the cost of insurance deters 
purchase, raising questions about the fairness of compelling them to finance 
others’ care, as addressed in Part III. 
In addition, while it is easiest to conceptualize the financiers as a static 
population, they are ever-changing and difficult to identify.  The population of 
financiers will shift over time; someone may be a financier in one year and a 
beneficiary of other financiers in another as he ages or if he experiences, for 
any number of reasons, an increased risk of poor health.  The point of using 
the term financier is to recognize explicitly that in health financing, every year 
some people can reasonably anticipate being net contributors, subsidizing 
other peoples’ premiums and medical care.  The mandate does not 
differentiate financiers from non-financiers.  It simply requires that someone 
participate both in the years that he expects to be a net contributor as well as 
when he is likely to be a net beneficiary.   
There are no good estimates on the dollar amount that financiers’ 
premiums might provide to subsidize others’ care.  And in fact, it is quite 
difficult to measure this moving target, which depends on the design and 
range of plans available for purchase and how much premiums are allowed to 
vary based upon individual characteristics.  The more financiers have access to 
plans that are priced based upon their expected low risk (i.e., low cost, high 
deductible health plans), the less surplus they will pay in premiums above 
expenditures.  This calculus also depends on whether opt-outs use more care 
once insured because they are able to access necessary care or because they 
become cost-insensitive once insurance pays for care – a phenomenon 
referred to as moral hazard.64   
 Nonetheless, I offer a conservative ballpark estimate, based upon the 
world of insurance pre-reform and intended for illustrative purposes only, to 
                                                 
62 If reform lowers the price of insurance or if once insured, they consume more care (i.e., 
moral hazard), the gap between consumption and premiums paid will narrow. 
63 Gruber, supra note 4, at 581. 
64 See e.g., Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q. J. Econ. 541 (1979). 
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suggest that their contribution is significant.  Let us assume that under an 
individual mandate the voluntary opt-outs will buy insurance and pay 
premiums on average of $4000 per person, per year.65  This means 17 million 
people newly insured would pay on average $4000 per person, or nearly $70 
billion in premium revenue.  They will of course incur some expenses to pay 
for medical care, overhead, and insurer profit.  Yet virtually half of the 
population experiences essentially no medical care costs in any one year.66  
Presumably, many voluntary opt-outs fall into this category for the reasons 
discussed above.  Even if we assume conservatively that half of the newly 
insured population’s premiums go toward expenses, there would still be an 
over $35 billion infusion of financing into risk pools.  While this estimate is 
extremely rough, it illustrates the potential of voluntary opt-outs as financiers.  
While insufficient to fund the entire cost of covering the uninsured (estimates 
are about $100-150 billion per year67), this surplus could nevertheless be quite 
significant.    
Thus, in summary, the individual mandate is a tool to compel the 
heterogeneous population of uninsured into existing insurance markets and, 
in the process, will compel all to be consumers of insurance and a subset also 
to be financiers of others’ medical care. 
III. PATERNALISM, EFFICIENCY, AND HEALTH REDISTRIBUTION
  
By compelling the 46 million uninsured to carry insurance, the individual 
mandate can serve three primary types of policy objectives that I will 
characterize as paternalism, efficiency, and health redistribution. 68  Failure to 
clearly identify and consider each of these three types of objectives 
independently in policy discussions has obscured the fact that the individual 
mandate will face critical problems in achieving certain objectives, 
particularly health redistribution.  Support for the mandate is rooted in all 
three objectives (although not all supporters care about all objectives), as 
                                                 
65 The average premium per individual is roughly $5000 and per family is roughly 
$12,000 for group coverage.  The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Average Health Insurance 
Premiums and Worker Contributions for Family Coverage, 1999-2008 (2008), 
http://facts.kff.org/chart.aspx?ch=706.  About 1/3 of the uninsured are individuals and the 
other 2/3 are part of families.  KFF Health Insurance Coverage in America, supra note 
49, at 6.  With an average family size of 3 in the U.S., those buying family plans will pay $4000 
per person.  U.S. Census Bureau, Fact Sheet: 2006-2007 American Community Survey 3-Year 
Estimates, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/ACSSAFFFacts (last visited Mar. 9, 2009).  A 
rough weighted estimate is $4300 per person.  Yet, if average premiums decrease when more 
healthy people enroll or if these healthy people pay lower than average premiums, these 
estimates may be high; thus, I use $4000 to be conservative.      
66 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, 
Revisited, 20(2) Health Aff. 9, 12 (2001). 
67 Jonathan Oberlander, Great Expectations - The Obama Administration and Health 
Care Reform, 360 New Eng. J. Med. 321, 322 (2009).   
68 C.f. Gruber, supra note 4 (outlining arguments for universal coverage in general, which 
includes these three categories, among others).   
OIL AND WATER 23  
 
reflected in legislative records in Massachusetts69 and in proposals for a 
mandate as part of national reform.70      
While different, these objectives are often not completely distinct.  Rather, 
they are interrelated, interdependent, and undoubtedly blur at times.  For 
example, an individual mandate would serve paternalistic and efficiency ends 
simultaneously if it compels people to behave in their own best interest and in 
doing so results in greater efficiency.  In fact, some scholars argue that 
efficiency gains provide justification for paternalistic action.71  Similarly, a law 
such as compulsory vaccination may result in an efficient outcome, protect the 
vaccinated individual himself, and more equally distribute the cost of 
preventing disease.   
The purpose of disaggregating these three objectives with respect to the 
individual mandate is not to argue that they are completely distinct.  Rather, 
it is to expose where the mandate will most likely fall short – in particular on 
redistributive aims – if implemented in a fragmented health insurance 
market.    
A. Paternalism 
Paternalism motivates law based on a belief that the government knows 
what is best for an individual and, thus, will compel the individual to act in a 
particular way for his or her “own good.”72  In doing so, policymakers 
substitute their own preferences for an individual’s actuated preference.  
Because paternalistic mandates attempt to compel individuals to make 
choices that are in their own best interest, the paternalistic objective of the 
mandate should only apply to uninsured who are in fact making an irrational 
decision to be uninsured at a particular point in time. 73   
There is a long history of mandates motivated by paternalism.  Mandatory 
use of seatbelts aims to protect drivers and passengers in a car from injury.  
Mandatory waiting periods on contracts intend to protect someone from 
agreeing in haste or under pressure to something that he will later regret.  
Even mandates that are intended primarily to serve other objectives may be 
partially motivated by paternalism.  Compulsory vaccinations, while perhaps 
primarily intended to promote herd immunity (an efficiency goal), also serve 
to prevent an individual from being vulnerable, herself, to contracting polio or 
                                                 
69 See Health Care Access and Affordability Conference Committee Report 
2006, http://www.mass.gov/legis/summary.pdf [hereinafter Conference Committee 
Report].   
70 See, e.g., Sen. Max Baucus, Call to Action: Health Reform 2009 (2008), 
http://finance.senate.gov/healthreform2009/finalwhitepaper.pdf.   
71 “Asymmetric paternalism” justifies paternalistic interventions so long as they help 
irrational people avoid making costly mistakes while causing little or no harm to rational 
people.  Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the 
Case for ‘Asymmetric Paternalism,’ 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211, 1212 (2003); see also Eyal Zamir, 
The Efficiency of Paternalism, 84 Va. L. Rev. 229, 230 (1998) (efficiency analysis can 
“provide[] a central justification for paternalism”). 
72 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 Md. L. 
Rev. 563 (1982) (discussing paternalism and retribution in the law).   
73 Of course, policymakers could misjudge best interest and create a harmful paternalistic 
intervention.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
Stan. L. Rev. 1471, 1543 (1998).   
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measles.74  Automobile insurance mandates, while primarily aiming to ensure 
victims of accidents access to remedy, also prevent an uninsured injurer from 
personal liability for the cost of harm to others. 
Scholars have long wrestled with the question of when, if ever, legal 
paternalism is justified, making the case for a limited set of circumstances in 
which it might be most appropriate. 75  The earliest defense was for laws 
serving to protect groups of people who might not be able to make good 
decisions for themselves, such as children and the mentally handicapped.76  
More recently, behavioral psychologists and economists have justified broader 
paternalistic intervention to remedy actual behavior that deviates from what 
is considered fully-informed, rational behavior.77  That is, paternalism is 
justified so long as it corrects for cases of systematic decision-making errors or 
“bounded rationality.”78  Such errors might occur when a decision maker has 
access to incomplete information, fails to understand complex information, or 
is biased in a way that leads her to an irrational decision.79  Commonly 
discussed types of bias include over-optimism, over-pessimism, or myopia in 
the case of discord between immediate preferences and future preferences. 80  
In such cases, paternalistic intervention would prompt an individual to make 
the decision he would make if perfectly informed and rational.  
The paternalistic objective for an individual health insurance mandate 
concerns the mandate’s ability to convert the irrationally uninsured into 
consumers of health insurance as a gateway to their own improved health and 
greater financial security. 81  Individuals often make an irrational decision not 
to buy health insurance, in large part due to individuals’ optimism bias with 
respect to their future health, sometimes called the “superman effect,” that 
prevents them from acknowledging their own vulnerability.82  Even with the 
                                                 
74   Some believe the risk of side effects from vaccination in fact outweigh the potential 
benefits, making vaccination contrary to best-interest.  For example, early polio vaccinations 
had a high likelihood of infecting someone with the disease and, more recently, some are 
concerned that vaccinations have caused an increased incidence of autism.  See, e.g., 
Generation Rescue, http://www.generationrescue.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2009). 
75 Even for those who would not object to legal paternalism, mandates may be too strong 
of a tool.  Some advocate for “soft paternalism,” such as default rules, information disclosure 
requirements, or cooling off periods to shape behavior by encouraging people to behave in 
their own best interest rather than mandating they do so.  Camerer et al., supra note 71, at 
1224; see generally Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions 
About Health, Wealth, and Happiness (2008) (promoting choice architecture to influence 
choices with greater subtlety). 
76 See Camerer et al., supra note 71, at 1213 (2003) (providing a brief history of 
justification for paternalism); Zamir, supra note 71, at 229. 
77 Camerer et al., supra note 71, at 1212.   
78 Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Thaler explored such phenomena of 
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded self interest.  Jolls et al., supra note 73; 
see also Herbert A. Simon, Rationality and Administrative Decision Making, in Models of 
Man: Social and Rational 196-207 (1957). 
79  Jolls et al., supra note 73. 
80 See Zamir, supra note 71, at 251.     
81 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 4, at 582.  Cf. Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, 
True Security: Rethinking America’s Security 171-72 (1999) (explaining the purpose of 
social health insurance as protecting against the dual risks of inadequate income and 
“unacceptably steep” decline in living standards due to medical expenses).   
82  Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Young Invincibles, Regulation, 
Winter 2009-2010, at 20, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n4/v32n4-4.pdf. 
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best intentions, consumers may have difficulty estimating the complexity of 
medical risk and thus undervalue the benefit of insurance.83  While health 
insurance does not guarantee good medical care, research shows that the 
inverse is true; the lack of health insurance results in worse care and health 
outcomes for many, including increased mortality.84  Further, studies 
demonstrate that uninsured Americans are at greater financial risk for 
problems including insolvency, foreclosure, or bankruptcy.85  Thus, it is not 
surprising that some supporters of the mandate would invoke it to correct for 
decision-making errors that cause people not to purchase health insurance, 
leaving themselves vulnerable to these types of health and financial risks.  
However, the paternalistic justification for the mandate can only go so far.  
Most importantly, as noted above, this paternalistic justification deals with a 
subset of uninsured who are behaving irrationally.  Assuming a portion of the 
uninsured are currently making a rational decision not to purchase health 
insurance because the cost of premiums exceed the likely benefit to them, 
compelling them to buy insurance is arguably not in their self-interest and 
thus, by definition, must be justified by something other than paternalism.86  
In particular, in a market where someone can opt out in his twenties and buy 
in without penalty in his thirties (so long as his health holds out), twenty year-
olds might make a good bet to go bare.  Furthermore, the paternalistic 
potential of a mandate only reaches so far as the value of insurance policies 
available and affordable to each individual.  If policies do not provide 
sufficient coverage, have cost-sharing levels that deter appropriate use of 
health care, or provide low coverage limits so that the sick outspend their 
policies, such policies might not achieve the health and financial security 
desired by policymakers.87  In other words, their value might be low enough 
that their benefits do not in fact outweigh their costs to some.  Finally, 
paternalism may be insufficient on its own to justify an individual mandate.  
As noted above, legal scholars often justify paternalistic interventions based 
upon the coexistence of other intentions, including efficiency goals.88  A 
mandate aimed primarily at paternalistic goals may be more vulnerable to 
                                                 
83   Id. at 23; Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, Complex 
Insurance, Subtle Subsidies, in Using Taxes to Reform Health Insurance: Pitfalls and 
Promises 230, 230-51 (Henry J. Aaron and Leonard E. Burman eds., 2009). 
84 Diane Rowland & Adele Shartzer, America’s Uninsured: The Statistics and Back Story, 
36 J.L. Med. & Ethics 618, 618 (2008).  See also Gruber, supra note 4, at 582 (citing the 
Institute of Medicine study and others showing impact of insurance on health); Wilper, supra 
note 7, at 2289. 
85 David U. Himmelstein et al., Marketwatch: Illness and Injury as Contributors to 
Bankruptcy, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w5-63 (2005), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w5.63v1; Christopher T. Robertson et al., 
Get Sick, Get Out:  The Medical Causes of Home Foreclosures, 18 Health Matrix 65, 95 
(2008). 
86 Of course, because some of the costs of medical care are unpredictable, it is difficult to 
tell who is making a rational decision ex-ante.  But, as discussed in Part II, with the irregular 
distribution of medical costs, a significant subset of the uninsured who expect low medical 
costs will indeed incur low costs. 
87 See Light, supra note 16, at 2503-08. 
88 See e.g., Camerer et al., supra note 71; Zamir, supra note 71.  Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, 
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763 (1983) (explaining paternalistic 
limitation on contractual freedom by considerations of economic efficiency, distributive 
fairness, personal integrity, or sound judgment). 
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assertions of excessive intervention into personal choice, as evidenced by 
resistance to mandates that are perceived as overly paternalistic, such as 
mandated use of motorcycle helmets or mandated vaccination against the 
human papillomavirus (HPV).89  
B. Efficiency  
Efficiency motivates law based upon a belief that such a law can increase 
overall welfare so that, at least potentially, everyone can be made better off 
according to his or her own preferences.  It reflects a situation where the 
government solves – by mandate – what the market cannot or has not solved.  
Most of the discussion of the individual mandate to date has focused on its 
efficiency potential, largely obscuring other objectives under the frame of 
efficiency. 
Mandates have often been used in the name of efficiency.  They might, for 
example, eliminate or reduce negative externalities.  Consider the case of 
motor vehicle insurance.  Compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws emerged 
in the early twentieth century as a way to address the problem of a motorist 
unable to compensate victims of his negligence.90  Such laws compel solvency 
so that injurers must internalize the costs they generate and, in theory, 
efficiently invest in cost avoidance.91  Similarly, a mandate could solve a 
collective action problem, where inefficiency results either because of “free 
riding,” when an individual enjoys a shared (public) benefit without bearing 
any costs of generating it, or when transaction costs thwart coordinated 
action.  A mandate can address both such problems.  For example, in the case 
of compulsory vaccination, any individual might be personally better off 
avoiding the risks associated with vaccination so long as enough of his 
community members are vaccinated to produce “herd immunity” and to stop 
                                                 
89 While mandatory motorcycle helmet laws offer potential efficiency gains (e.g., reduce 
costs of emergency response, injury, and death from accidents), they were challenged as overly 
paternalistic. The federal government eventually lifted financial penalties levied on states 
without helmet laws, and the once universal laws have since been either repealed or limited to 
apply to minors in two-thirds of states.  See Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, Helmet 
Use Laws (Mar. 2010), http://www.iihs.org/laws/HelmetUseOverview.aspx.  Even the 
suggestion that a mandate is paternalistic may weaken its authority, as evinced by the case of 
mandatory HPV vaccination.  Some scholars make a compelling case that compulsory HPV 
vaccination serves important public health goals. E.g., Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus 
Vaccination, Private Choice, and Public Health, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1731 (2008); Kyra R. 
Wagoner, Mandating the Gardasil Vaccine: A Constitutional Analysis, 5 Ind. Health L. Rev. 
403 (2008). Opponents argue that an HPV vaccination mandate is overly paternalistic.  E.g., 
Tracy Solomon Dowling, Mandating a Human Papillomavirus Vaccine: An Investigation into 
Whether Such Legislation is Constitutional and Prudent, 34 Am. J. L. & Med. 65 (2008); Gail 
Javitt et al., Assessing Mandatory HPV Vaccination: Who Should Call the Shots?, 36 J. L. Med. 
& Ethics 384, 384 (2008).  Whether objectors are actually offended by paternalism or 
resistant to a mandate that they fear implicitly authorizes sexual activity by creating a 
perception that sex is “safe” post-vaccination, they use rhetoric of paternalism to undermine 
the validity of the mandate. 
90 Robert H. Jerry, II & Douglas R. Richmond, Understanding Insurance Law 953, 
954 (LexisNexis 4th ed. 2007).   
91 Id. at 956-57, 960.  While debatable how much of the costs are internalized when 
insurance pays for harm, arguably, paying for insurance premiums that increase with driving 
incidents provides more incentive for safety than does externalizing all of the costs of an 
accident.   
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transmission within the community.92  However, if too many in a community 
free ride on others’ vaccinations, the community risks not achieving 
immunity.  When the benefit to all of herd immunity and subsequent 
eradication of disease is greater than the cost of vaccination to the 
unvaccinated, compulsory vaccination is efficient.93  Mandatory vaccinations 
have been found constitutional under the police power to “protect the public 
health and the public safety,” 94 even when decisions regarding individual 
bodies and health were involved.95   
By compelling everyone to be a consumer of insurance, the individual 
health insurance mandate might serve several efficiency objectives that I will 
discuss in turn.  First, it may reduce insurance market inefficiency due to 
adverse selection, regarded as the major market failure of insurance 
markets.96  Second, it could eliminate inefficient use of care by the uninsured 
in emergency rooms, the cost of which is often externalized (i.e., free-riding).97  
Third, it can smooth medical care costs over an individual’s lifetime. 
First, if the individual mandate successfully drives everyone to consume 
insurance, it would eliminate adverse selection into health insurance markets.  
This is the primary motivation economists cite for the individual mandate.98  
Adverse selection is a problem of information asymmetry in insurance 
markets.99  Insurers are concerned that those who seek insurance are more 
likely than average to consume medical care because of something the buyers 
know about their own health, family history, or behavior that insurers don’t 
know and can’t easily discover.  
Despite academic disagreement on the true extent of adverse selection 
into markets, insurers behave as if it is a problem, particularly in the 
individual market where insurers have greater fear of higher-risk individuals 
                                                 
92 See Kevin M. Malone & Alan R. Hinman, Vaccination Mandates: The Public Health 
Imperative and Individual Rights, in Law in Public Health Practice 338, 339-40 (Richard 
Alan Goodman et al. eds., 2007). 
93 States with vaccination mandates average 85% immunization rates versus 77% in non-
mandate states.  Paul E. M. Fine, Herd Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 
Epidemiologic Rev. 265, 268 (1983). Vaccination efforts are credited with the eradication of 
smallpox, near eradication of polio, and control of measles.  In the United States, morbidity by 
vaccine-preventable diseases has been reduced by 87-99%, depending on the disease.  See 
Walter A. Orenstein et al., Immunizations in the United States: Success, Structure, and Stress, 
24 Health Aff. 599, 599-600 (2005); see also Malone & Hinman, supra note 92, at 338.   
94 Jacobson v. Mass., 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905).  
95 Id. at 26 (citing Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 471 (1878); Missouri, Kansas & 
Texas Ry. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 628-29 (1898); Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 
Vt. 140, 148 (1854)). 
96 See e.g., Linda J. Blumberg & John Holohan, The Individual Mandate – An Affordable 
and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 New Eng. J. Med. 6 (2009); see also 
Sherry Glied, Universal Coverage One Head at a Time – The Risks and Benefits of Individual 
Health Insurance Mandates, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 1540, 1541 (2008).   
97 See RAND Compare, Analysis of Individual Mandate, 
http://www.randcompare.org/analysis/mechanism/individual_mandate (last visited July 8, 
2009) (summarizing studies on the effects of expanded insurance coverage on ED care).   
98  Gruber, supra note 4, at 601. 
99  E.g., David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 
1 Frontiers in Health Policy Research (1998), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6107. 
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seeking out insurance, which creates inefficiency. 100 Insurers have little 
concern of adverse selection with respect to large, employer-sponsored group 
insurance.  Because these groups are formed for non-health reasons and 
almost all employees enroll in coverage, the distribution of risk in them is 
reasonably predictable and stable.101  Group risk becomes less predictable as a 
group becomes smaller and thus the concern of adverse selection increases.102  
In the individual market, every applicant is considered an unmitigated 
adverse selection risk. 
Insurers respond in two ways that drive up the cost of insurance and, as a 
result, price buyers out.  First, insurers charge a higher premium based upon a 
rational presumption that higher-risk individuals will more often choose to 
purchase insurance than lower-risk individuals.   Even when the premium 
accurately reflects average risk in the pool, unraveling will occur.103   Low-risk 
individuals become more likely to exit the market as premium prices escalate 
above what they perceive to be the value of health insurance, leaving more 
high-risk insureds behind.  Reflecting the then higher average medical costs 
per person in the pool, insurers increase premiums, prompting lower-risk 
insureds to drop coverage.  At its logical extreme, this cycle results in the 
adverse selection death spiral.104  This phenomenon is also called the 
“standard lemons pricing effect,” or “the bad driving the good out of a 
market.”105   
Second, insurers counter adverse selection through risk selection and 
classification practices to the extent permitted by state law,106 driving up 
overhead costs.  For example, insurers use medical underwriting to design and 
price coverage based upon an individual’s projected risk.107  If a group or 
                                                 
100 Id.; see also Mark V. Pauly & Len M. Nichols, The Nongroup Health Insurance Market: 
Short on Facts, Long On Opinions and Policy Disputes, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) 325, 
327 (Oct. 23, 2002) (arguing that adverse selection is clear in regulated nongroup markets and 
less clear in unregulated ones but concluding that nonetheless, insurers’ fear of adverse 
selection is real and drives underwriting and pricing behavior); Peter Siegelman, Adverse 
Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 Yale. L.J. 1223, 1226 (2004) 
(arguing that propitious selection, or the preference of risk averse who also tend to be more 
self-preserving to buy insurance, balances out any adverse selection); Gruber, supra note 4, at 
577 (discussing economic literature on adverse selection within health insurance markets).   
101 Gruber, supra note 4, at 574; Swartz, supra note 44, at 96.    
102 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., How Private Health Coverage Works: A 
Primer 2008 Update 7, 5 (2008) [hereinafter HOW PRIVATE HEALTH COVERAGE WORKS].   
103  See generally Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 99. 
104 Id. at 14. 
105 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainly and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 489-90 (1970) (showing that in the used car market 
information asymmetry leads to pricing based on the average used car, which causes sellers of 
a good used cars to leave the market because they cannot get a high enough price, leaving 
“lemons” behind).  See also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive 
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON 629 
(1976) (discussing information asymmetry in competitive insurance markets).   
106 See text accompanying infra note 228 for discussion of state laws prohibiting risk 
selection. 
107 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Risk Selection by Private Health Insurers: Why Regulation 
Alone Cannot Solve the Problem, 
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Faculty/Jost%20Risk%20Selection%20by%20Private%20He
alth%20Insurers.pdf (providing  description of different practices insurers use for risk 
selection).  See also sources cited supra note 16.  See also Kaiser Family Foundation, infra note 
228, for description of state laws that prohibit such practices. 
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individual has high expected expenses, the insurer might charge a higher 
premium or limit coverage through exclusion of certain pre-existing 
conditions.  If a person has already manifested an expensive disease, such as 
liver disease, the insurer might deny coverage altogether.108  Insurers also use 
sophisticated practices of marketing and benefit/network design to guide low-
risk and high-risk beneficiaries to different insurance products.109  That is, 
they try to get customers to signal their own risk by self-segregating to 
products on the basis of risk.  For example, insurers may try to attract healthy 
beneficiaries by offering fitness benefits, low-cost preventative care or a low-
cost, high-deductible policy.  On the flip side, by offering comprehensive 
cancer coverage, an insurer might steer someone with a family history of 
cancer to a more expensive policy.110 
The use of such practices drives up administrative costs associated with 
insurance, resulting in higher load factors (administrative costs plus profits) 
in the small group and individual markets, where the risk of adverse selection 
is higher and these practices are more intensively used, as discussed further in 
Part IV.111  Estimates are that administrative costs account for as much as 30-
40 percent of premiums in the individual market in some states; 25-27 
percent in the small group market; and only about 5-10 percent in large group 
market.112  Because of these costs, some people who would like to buy 
insurance are priced out of the market and some pay more than they would 
for insurance in a more efficient market.   
If the mandate does in fact eliminate adverse selection into markets by 
discouraging low-risk individuals from avoiding or dropping health insurance 
coverage, it might ameliorate some of this inefficiency.  In particular, 
elimination of adverse selection into markets will most likely reduce the 
standard lemons pricing effect.  Following a mandate, insurers can no longer 
assume that applicants are disproportionately lemons.  Rationally behaving 
insurers in a competitive market would no longer charge “lemons” premiums, 
based on assumption of higher-than-average risk enrollees, thus making 
insurance affordable to more people. 
While it is also possible that the mandate might reduce administrative 
costs arising from risk selection practices, it is equally possible the individual 
mandate might have no effect on or even drive up such costs.  As the average 
risk of applicants decreases post-mandate, it may be less profitable for 
insurers to use underwriting and marketing to identify and avoid high risks.  
If such practices were reduced or eliminated, administrative costs would 
decline and insurance might be affordable for an even larger set of people.   
That being said, there is good reason to believe the ability of the 
individual mandate alone to decrease administrative costs may be limited (I’ll 
argue below that a mandate that achieves the goal of health redistribution 
unlocks potential for greater administrative efficiencies).  While the mandate 
eliminates adverse selection into the insurance market as a whole, the 
potential for adverse selection among insurers or into different insurance 
                                                 
108 Swartz, supra note 44, at 97.  
109 Light, supra note 16, at 2504. 
110 Swartz, supra note 44, at 97. 
111 Gruber, supra note 4, at 574.   
112 Pauly & Nichols, supra note 100, at 326. 
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products will remain.  And insurers will have lost one signal as to who is high-
risk once seeking out insurance can no longer be used as a signal that 
someone has a higher-than-average risk.  Thus, insurers may in fact have 
more of an incentive to use marketing to attract healthier beneficiaries than 
their competitors do and to use marketing or benefit design practices to 
encourage applicants to self-segregate into different products according to 
risk.  There are not yet empirical studies measuring how the individual 
mandate will affect the use of risk selection practices and thus the 
administrative costs of insurance; such studies could illuminate the extent of 
the costs resulting from adverse selection that might be addressed by a 
mandate alone.  What we do know, however, is that when certain practices for 
identifying risk are banned, insurers tend to rely on other practices – both 
legal and illegal – to identify higher-risk applicants.113   
A second way the mandate might promote efficiency is by eliminating 
externalized costs of care by the uninsured; this free-riding, while a much-
discussed problem by the popular media, in reality likely offers limited 
potential in terms of both efficiency and cost savings.114  In our current system, 
we guarantee everyone access to emergency services regardless of ability to 
pay under the Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA).115  This security blanket might be causing some people to opt out 
of insurance and use free resources for care knowing that if they are in urgent 
need of medical attention, they can receive it.116  If an uninsured person 
receives care in the emergency room and does not pay for this care, it is 
considered “uncompensated” at the point of services, and the costs are folded 
into premiums paid by the insured.117  Estimates of uncompensated care costs 
range from $30 billion to $56 billion per year in the U.S.118   
Elimination of use of ER care by the uninsured is widely cited as a reason 
for an individual mandate.119  The theory is that if the uninsured could access 
care in cheaper clinical settings, they could get the same or better services less 
expensively.  In reality, studies conflict on how much of the use of ER care is 
in fact inefficient, how much efficiency gain is possible, and how much 
efficiency loss might result from clinical waste in routine services used by the 
newly insured.120   
More importantly, this potential of the mandate to reduce the use of ER 
care by the uninsured is typically erroneously framed as offering potential for 
overall cost savings due to a mandate.  Even if shifting care away from the ER 
                                                 
113 Jost, supra note 107, at 1. 
114 Gruber, supra note 4, at 582. 
115 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
116 Studies conflict on whether the availability of free care is in fact a relevant factor in 
people’s decision to buy insurance or not.  See Gruber, supra note 4, at 578. 
117 Hadley et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and 
Incremental Costs, 27 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) 399, 402 (Aug. 25 2008). 
118 Gruber, supra note 4, at 582 (estimating the cost of uncompensated care at $30 billion 
annually); Hadley et al., supra note 117, at 399; (estimating uncompensated care at $56B). 
119 See, e.g., William F. Frist, An Individual Mandate for Health Insurance Would Benefit 
All, U.S. News.com, Sept. 28, 2009, 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/2009/09/28/frist-an-individual-mandate-for-
health-insurance-would-benefit-all.html?PageNr=2. 
120 RAND Compare, supra note 97, at 8-9 (citing studies on possible clinical efficiency 
gains and losses from expanded coverage).   
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by increasing the number of insured is efficient, it is unlikely to save money.  
In fact, studies have shown that once the uninsured have insurance, they will 
use more care than before, which will increase overall health spending by as 
much as two times.121  Some of this increase might reflect greater inefficiency 
due to moral hazard – overuse of care once a third-party payer is subsidizing 
the consumption.122  Some of this increase is also a result of people getting 
access to much-needed care that they couldn’t get before.  Even though 
insuring everyone might lead to better health outcomes and some reduction of 
inefficient spending, it will increase health care spending overall, at least in 
the short term.   
Finally, the mandate can help smooth an individual’s spending for health 
care over a lifetime.  As discussed above, Americans today go to extreme 
measures to pay for medical care and sometimes end up filing for bankruptcy 
or in other financial distress.123  Health insurance can prevent such problems 
by enabling individuals to smooth medical spending in two ways.  First, 
insurance might serve as a way for an individual to borrow from his future self 
for care needed today.  If someone has a skiing accident this year that costs 
her $30,000 for medical care, her insurance will pay for this care, but such 
payment can be conceptualized as a loan from future premium payments she 
will make in healthy, accident-free years.  On the flip side, it might be possible 
that she pays $5000 a year for the next fifty years before she needs any 
expensive care.  In this case, her years of paying excess premiums (as 
compared to her consumption) might be seen as “savings” for this care when 
old.  Thus, efficiency may result from intrapersonal redistribution of health 
costs over a lifetime.     
In sum, primarily by converting the uninsured into consumers of health 
insurance, many see the individual mandate as a tool to achieve efficiency 
gains from reducing adverse selection, enabling more efficient use of care, and 
smoothing health care costs over a lifetime.   
C. Health Redistribution and Solidarity  
Finally, redistribution - the focus of the remainder of this article – 
motivates law that promotes a reordering of resources among people.  The 
individual mandate can serve a redistributive objective by compelling the 
healthy or lucky to buy insurance to help finance care for the sick or unlucky.  
This redistribution by mandate, which I call “health redistribution,” differs 
from income redistribution, a more common conception of redistribution 
from the wealthy to the poor.   
As subsection 2 examines, health redistribution can generate a number of 
benefits – political, pragmatic, and moral.  For example, through health 
redistribution, the mandate might enhance the political feasibility of funding 
universal insurance coverage, address distributive justice concerns with 
minimal labor distortion, and unlock further insurance market efficiencies.  
                                                 
121 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Covering the Uninsured in 2008: Key 
Facts about Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs 11 (August 
2008) [hereinafter KFF Covering the Uninsured in 2008]; RAND Compare, supra note 
97, at 8-9. 
122 See Shavell, supra note 64, at 541.  
123 See Himmelstein et al., supra note 85, at w5-66. 
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For many, though, the critical importance of the mandate’s ability to promote 
health redistribution is to institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of health 
insurance, where access to health care is divorced from factors other than 
need.124 
1. Health Redistribution 
The final policy objective some hope individual mandate will serve is 
“health redistribution.”  In essence, the mandate compels the healthy to 
finance care for those sicker than themselves.   
Because the mandate operates in insurance markets, its ability to effect 
health redistribution depends on health insurance as a mechanism for risk 
pooling.  When in risk pools together, the healthy and sick can pay for 
insurance in a way that the healthy majority subsidizes premiums and medical 
care for the sick or injured minority.125     
While paternalism and efficiency objectives rely to a large degree on 
converting the uninsured into consumers of health insurance, the 
redistributive objective relies as much on the mandate’s ability to influence 
the healthy as potential financiers of care for the sick.  This influence over the 
uninsured reaches beyond what paternalism would justify because the opt-
outs’ purchase serves another’s interest, rather than self-interest.  It also 
reaches beyond what efficiency objectives alone would justify to the extent the 
goal is shifting dollars from one person to another without increasing the total 
pie. 
Health redistribution can occur in two different ways within the structure 
of health insurance.  First, ex-ante, purchase of insurance by the healthy 
“financiers” can make it easier for everyone to afford insurance premiums.  
When more low-risk individuals join a risk pool, the cost of premiums in that 
pool can be reduced for all members.126  Imagine a hypothetical risk pool with 
two people.  The first has expected risk of $8000 and the second of $5000.  
The average expected cost in the pool is $6500, and each person will be 
charged a $6500 premium (plus overhead costs) if all members of the pool 
pay the average price.  Now, imagine a voluntary opt-out with an expected risk 
of $2000 joins this pool.  The average expected cost drops to $5000.  If all 
pool members share risk equally, the individual with expected costs of $2000 
and the one with $8,000 each pay $5000 this year.  In other words, the 
surplus, as discussed above, that the financiers pay in premiums beyond their 
own expected costs can subsidize care for those in need of it and lead to lower 
premiums for others in the pools they join.  Support for ex-ante risk pooling 
that smoothes premium costs among insureds has come in and out of vogue in 
the American insurance system, as discussed further below, and garners more 
controversy than the notion of ex-post pooling, which people tend to more 
readily identify as the type of redistribution we could expect through 
insurance.127 
                                                 
124  See infra Part III.C.2.a 
125 See Stone, supra note 12, at 292.   
126 This assumes a competitive markets, where insurers don’t capture the benefit of low-
cost enrollees as additional profit.   
127 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12 (discussing of the shifting limits of risk pooling over 
time).   
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Second, universal participation helps to distribute wealth ex-post to 
anyone who experiences a medical loss in any one year to make them whole 
for that loss.  Ex-ante, everyone bears some risk of incurring medical costs, 
but it is not clear who will actually suffer the loss in any one year.128  In other 
words, imagine we all pay equally into an insurance pool in a year, not 
knowing to whom this money will be distributed in the form of medical care.  
Those who are made “poorer” by sickness in any one year will have resources 
distributed to them to cushion such a decrease in wealth.  Imagine in the 
hypothetical above that the person with estimated risk of $5000 were in a 
biking accident and actually incurred a $10,000 bill for medical care.  Even 
though $10,000 is more than he was projected to incur in costs this year, ex-
post he receives payment out of the pool to make him whole for his bad luck.  
Thus, regardless of the fact that some people will be financiers, or net payers, 
in any one year (the healthy or lucky) and others will be net beneficiaries in 
any one year (the sick or unlucky), everyone pays in and everyone has equal 
opportunity to draw out funds for care.  The mandate requires more people to 
participate in this type of ex-post sharing of losses.   
Health redistribution is normatively complex, and might concern even 
those who broadly support redistributive goals.  First, health redistribution 
can be regressive.  Imagine a mandate requires every American to pay an 
equal amount for insurance, regardless of income.  By doing so, it promotes 
horizontal equity (the notion that people with the same income should 
contribute equally) but simultaneously violates principles of vertical equity 
(the corollary that those with greater income should contribute more).  The 
result is that the healthy poor could subsidize the sick wealthy, a result many 
would find troubling.   
Even in a national social insurance system, as in Canada or the UK, where 
universal care is funded through progressive taxes, it is still possible that the 
healthy poor or middle class help fund care for the wealthy sick.  Nonetheless, 
horizontal and vertical equity concerns are addressed more seamlessly in such 
social insurance systems where all citizens are provided access to medical care 
that is financed through proportional or progressive forms of taxation.  
Everyone who is taxable contributes.  Those who earn the same pay the same 
amount so long as the tax law treats them similarly (horizontal equity), and 
those earn more will pay more (vertical equity).   
Because seeking universal health care through mandate does not have a 
built-in mechanism to address vertical equity concerns, a policy built upon 
mandates must rely upon tax-based subsidies to ameliorate its regressive 
nature.  In fact, as advocated by health economist Jon Gruber, it would be 
imprudent and perhaps infeasible to implement an individual mandate 
without some degree of income-based subsidies (a “mandate plus subsidies” 
approach). 129  Doing so could mean asking some people to pay more for health 
insurance than they earn in income or to make undesirable tradeoffs in the 
name of compliance, such as eschewing food, shelter, or safety.  Subsidies 
raised through taxes could be used to cushion costs for lower income insureds, 
and thus make health reform by mandate less regressive in nature.  In fact, 
                                                 
128 See Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. 
Rev. 335, 359 (2001), for an exploration of this concept in terms of unemployment insurance. 
129 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 602. 
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Massachusetts subsidized the purchase of insurance up to 300 percent of 
FPL,130 and the Health Reform Law will provide for subsidies up to as high as 
400 percent of FPL.131     
Nonetheless, even with such subsidies, the mandate is still prone to be 
regressive anywhere above subsidy levels.  Imagine someone earning 500 
percent of FPL pays the same premium as someone earning 600 percent of 
FPL.  The lower income individual still pays a higher percent of his income for 
health insurance.  This result proves difficult to avoid unless health insurance 
were provided to all Americans and funded entirely through proportional or 
progressive taxation.     
A second concern with health redistribution, as opposed to income 
redistribution, is that the weight of health redistribution lies of the shoulders 
of the financiers, who are likely healthy and, for the most part, young.   
There are good reasons to believe it is not fair to ask the young to bear the 
costs of care for those older and sicker than themselves.  Nearly 30 percent of 
the uninsured are between nineteen and twenty-nine years old.132  Many of 
these uninsured are making a decision not to buy insurance because they are 
at low risk of incurring medical care costs.  In the worst of cases, they can 
access emergency room care even if uninsured because of legal requirements 
under EMTALA, as discussed above.  Many are not earning particularly high 
salaries.  Further, they are at a point where it is critical to invest in their 
education and careers.  The cost of insurance might thwart opportunities for 
higher education and might deter the young from careers where health 
benefits are not standard, such as small businesses and start-ups.   
We might address such concerns in part by allowing these “invincibles” to 
comply with a mandate in less burdensome ways or by limiting the portion of 
the costs of reform we impose on them.  Accordingly, we could create plans for 
the young that are tailored for low-risk individuals, such as the young adult 
health plans offered in Massachusetts, which have lower premiums in 
exchange for higher deductibles.  We could also allow them to stay on their 
parents’ insurance longer, which has been permitted in Massachusetts and 
some other states and included in the Health Reform Law.133  Alternately, 
Tom Baker and Peter Siegelman propose reinvigorating a form of insurance 
from nineteenth century life insurance called the Tontine.134  Tontines entice 
young invincibles to purchase insurance by offering a cash bonus for those 
who buy insurance and use little or no medical care during the policy term.135  
They benefit from coverage if necessary and, if not, they get a premium rebate 
to reduce the cost of insurance.   
Yet, this burden on the young might be less troubling if framed 
differently.  For example, it could be seen as participation in a cross-
                                                 
130  See Sharon Long, On The Road To Universal Coverage: Impacts In Massachusetts At 
One Year, 27 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w270, w270 (June 3, 2008). 
131  H.R. 3590, supra note 2. 
132 KFF The Uninsured, supra note 52, at 4. 
133  H.R. 3590, supra note 2.  Farhana Hossain & Archie Tse, Comparing the House and 
the Senate Health Care Proposals, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/11/19/us/politics/1119-plan-
comparison.html#tab=9. 
134 See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 83, passim. 
135 Id. at 3. 
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generational subsidy; in essence, the young subsidize their parents’ insurance.  
Further, their participation helps to stabilize a regime of more moderate 
premiums for older insureds that they will enjoy as adults, so their higher 
payments today could be seen as forced savings for health insurance for their 
future selves.  Finally, the tradeoff of allowing healthy young to pay less for 
insurance, or to qualify for a rebate when healthy, is diminished potential for 
health redistribution.  It is in essence a form of fragmentation, as discussed 
below, that thwarts goals of health redistribution.   
With health redistribution’s less appealing attributes of being regressive 
and burdening the young, why do some advocate for it?  The next section 
answers this question by probing the particular benefits of health 
redistribution – political, pragmatic, and moral – and whether such benefits 
outweigh these potential burdens on the poor and young. 
2. Benefits from Health Redistribution 
a. Political and Pragmatic Benefits of Health Redistribution  
The mandate’s ability to  promote health redistribution could generate 
both political and pragmatic benefits.  
First, health redistribution may be necessary politically in order to raise 
sufficient funding for health reform.  Subsidizing low-income uninsureds is 
estimated to cost over $80 billion per year.136  With the unpopularity of 
increased taxation, relying on it alone to cover subsidies of $80 billion a year 
may make reform politically impossible.  Successful health redistribution 
enables some subsidization to occur more discreetly within the bounds of risk 
pools because participation of the healthy lowers the average cost of 
premiums.  By doing so, it can lessen the subsidies that must be funded 
through taxes. 
Second, some believe health redistribution might offer a less costly way to 
address distributive justice concerns.137  If we conceptualize health as a 
component of wealth separate from income, we might want to tax it separately 
for equity reasons.138  Income wealth is a crude categorization of wealth and 
the primary one that we tax.  But it might not be a sufficient measure of 
overall wealth.  Imagine two people earn equal income but one has a 
congenital heart defect that limits his energy and mobility and requires 
expensive medical care over his entire life.  It is reasonable to believe that the 
sick individual is worse off than the healthy one, despite their equal earned 
income.  Because health can be an important determinant of overall welfare, 
some advocate treating health as a separate category of wealth that should be 
                                                 
136 See Congressional Budget Office, Preliminary Analysis of the Chairman's 
Mark for the America's Healthy Future Act, as Amended:  Letter to the Honorable 
Max Baucus 2 (October 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/106xx/doc10642/10-7-Baucus_letter.pdf (estimating a gross total 
of $829B over the next 10 years for credits and subsidies to expand insurance coverage, 
resulting in an estimated net cost of $518B over the next 10 years after revenues from 
additional taxes and other sources).  
137  See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care Morally, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449, 1490-91 
(1994).   
138 See e.g., Norman Daniels, Just Health (2008) (examining the role of health in 
social, political, economic policy). 
36 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 36 NO. 1 2010 
 
separately taxed; the mandate functions as a flat health tax for such 
purposes.139  
Even if health is not considered morally distinct from other core needs, 
such as shelter, nutrition, or a healthy environment, and thus has no inherent 
claim to differential treatment, health redistribution may still be appealing as 
a way to respond to distributive justice concerns while minimizing labor 
distortion.140  Professor Einer Elhauge argues that there are fewer reasons to 
oppose egalitarian distribution of health care because it meets a variable need 
with less harm to productive incentives than is true for other goods.141  This is 
because, first, people do not want to be sick and thus will not try to remain 
sick to continue getting benefits, which are distributed in the form of medical 
care.142  And second, there is little bureaucracy necessary to determine who is 
deserving of benefits as need is determined as part of the provision of medical 
care.143  Thus, health redistribution provides a more efficient way to take care 
of the poor or vulnerable, and in doing so it may also increase overall labor 
productivity to the extent healthier people are able to contribute more to 
society.144 
In line with this argument, health redistribution may be appealing if we 
believe health tracks more closely to ability to earn income than actual earned 
income does.  If our distributive goal is to provide for people unable to provide 
for themselves, health redistribution might be a more precise way to distribute 
resources to those unable to earn sufficient income because they are sick or 
injured, rather than to those who earn little income by choice. 
Finally, by achieving broad health redistribution, the mandate can unlock 
significant efficiency in insurance markets through more comprehensive 
elimination of adverse selection than can be achieved through a mandate that 
does not promote broad health redistribution.  This is because broad risk 
pooling – not the mandate on its own – is what unlocks part of the efficiency 
gains people anticipate might result from the mandate’s effect on adverse 
selection.   
As discussed in Part II.B, high administrative costs arise when insurers try 
to select out healthy customers and differentially treat higher-risk ones, and 
the mandate alone will not eliminate such sorting.  There are two ways to 
solve this inefficient and expensive sorting that arises out of informational 
asymmetry between insurers and customers.    First, assuming it were 
possible, we could provide insurers perfect information on every applicant and 
allow them to use such information so that insurers could underwrite all 
applicants with perfect accuracy and little effort.  Imagine this approach were 
possible and that the insurance market were to become more efficient because 
insurers are able to perfectly gauge an individual’s expected risk at no cost.  
This market would limit an individual’s premium costs to his own projected 
                                                 
139 See id.   
140 Elhauge, supra note 137, at 1490-91. 
141 Id.; but cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than 
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.L. Studies 667, 667 (1994) (arguing that 
distribution is most efficient through taxation, rather than through legal rules). 
142 Elhauge, supra note 137, at 1488.   
143 See id. at 1487.   
144 Gostin, supra note 12, at 28. 
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risk of sickness in the coming year.145  The benefit of this type of perfect 
actuarially-rated system is that the majority of people (who are low-risk) can 
obtain health insurance for the lowest possible premiums.  The problem with 
this system is that higher-risk individuals bear the full cost of their own risk. 
There is less smoothing of premiums over a lifetime and among beneficiaries.  
This approach opts to leave some people uninsured (the more vulnerable or 
high-risk populations who will face prohibitively high insurance premiums) in 
return for low cost insurance and an absence of coercion for the majority of 
insured, who are low-risk.146  Such a result – while efficient – would likely not 
appeal to many who support the mandate, even those who would claim their 
support is in the name of increased efficiency.  Furthermore, this approach 
would require providing genetic information and family health history to 
insurers in a way that is likely unacceptable to Americans and, not 
surprisingly, has been prohibited legislatively.147 
Alternatively, and perhaps the only real option in light of our present 
inability to provide insurers with perfect information even if we wanted to do 
so, we could blind insurers to risk altogether so that they charge every enrollee 
the same premium.  This approach is health redistribution at an extreme, 
completely divorcing insurance pricing from individual risk.  In a system of 
perfect health redistribution, we would pool all risk and charge everyone the 
same prices for insurance (or in a modified system, charge differential prices 
based upon standardized rules for a limited and objectively-defined 
population, such as providing 19-25 year olds plans at lower prices).  Insurers 
would no longer benefit from underwriting and risk selection and presumably 
would stop engaging in these expensive practices.  Thus, to the extent the 
mandate is able to draw people into markets that promote broad health 
redistribution, it can better unlock health insurance market efficiencies.  The 
mandate’s redistributive and efficiency objectives become inextricably linked 
because achieving the redistributive objective is a gateway to enhancing 
efficiency. 
 
b. Solidarity though Health Redistribution 
Finally, many scholars and policymakers have supported health 
redistribution as a means to institutionalize a more solidaristic regime of 
                                                 
145 There will still be ex-post pooling of losses.  That is, if I experience a $2M loss this 
year, others’ premium dollars will help to pay for my loss because even with risk spreading 
over my lifetime, I will never pay enough to cover my loss this year.  
146 See Len M. Nichols, State Regulation: What Have We Learned So Far?, 25 J. Health 
Pol., Pol’y & L. 175, 176 (2000).  The approach is not inconsistent with universal coverage.  
The government could choose to build universal insurance by filling in holes left by the market 
(and has in some ways done so now with public insurance programs, EMTALA, and publically 
funded free care) by subsidizing the high-risk people who cannot afford to pay or those who 
experience unexpected and unaffordable medical costs.  Yet, government intervention in this 
way may create incentives for everyone to buy cheap, low coverage policies and then seek out 
governmental assistance if they require expensive care.   
147 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, or GINA, which was signed into law 
by President Bush in 2008, prohibits insurers from using genetic information in medical 
underwriting.  Pub.L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008). 
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health insurance in the U.S. 148 Solidarity manifests when a particular goal is 
deemed important enough to warrant a coordinated approach to achieving it, 
even if some people may, in the end, contribute more than they, as 
individuals, receive in return.149  Solidarity depends upon people acting from 
more than simple self-interest, a motivation scholars have identified as “other-
regarding behavior” or “altruism.”150  With respect to health, the goal is often 
described as ensuring everyone in the community who needs medical care has 
equitable access to it.151  Professor Deborah Stone notes that “the ideal of the 
solidarity principle is that we should strive to distribute medical care 
according to medical need and to limit the influence of ability to pay, past 
consumption of medical care, or expected future consumption.”152  
This section explores how some supporters of the mandate see it as the 
key to creating a more solidaristic system of health insurance through health 
redistribution.  The final subsection explores whether creating a system of 
broad health redistribution might endogenously begin to redefine the level of 
mutual aid Americans expect to give and receive within a health insurance 
system. 
i. Comparative, historical, political, and popular support for solidarity  
Solidarity is a value most industrialized nations identify as key to their 
systems of health insurance.  Uwe Reinhardt describes solidarity as the 
foundation of social insurance institutions: “In Europe, as in Canada, that 
social ethic is based on the principle of social solidarity. It means that health 
care should be financed by individuals on the basis of their ability to pay, but 
should be available to all who need it on roughly equal terms. The regulations 
imposed on health care in these countries are rooted in this overarching 
principle.”153  Likewise, Richard Saltman similarly calls solidarity the “core 
animating principle” of European social health insurance systems.154   
                                                 
148 See sources cited in supra note 12 for examples of scholars who advocate policies of 
health redistribution, including but not exclusively considering the mandate, in order to 
institutionalize greater solidarity.   
149 E.g., Stone, supra note 12, at 290-91.  In order to finance universal coverage, there 
must be either shared commitment by all citizens to be willing to subsidize others or coercion 
of some to contribute.  See Marmor & Oberlander, supra note 1, at 212. 
150  See, e.g., Gillian Lester, Means Testing, Universalism, and the Formation of Social 
Preferences 20-22 (August 24, 2009) (unpublished draft, abstract available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461098).   
151 For examples of authorities on solidarity and health insurance, see supra note 12.  
“Need” can be defined in any number of ways.  It is beyond the scope of this article to 
determine the level of need that solidarity requires.  For this article, it is sufficient for 
insurance to equitably protect all members of a community.  In addition, solidarity with 
respect to health may demand that a community do more than just ensure medical care.  It 
could also demand that the community provide for clean water, shelter, healthy food, and 
other needs that are key determinants of health.  While solidarity could apply to any of these 
needs, this article focuses solely on medical care since that is the concern of the mandate for 
health insurance. 
152 Stone, supra note 12, at 292.   
153 Reinhardt, supra note 21.  Gösta Esping-Anderson describes how “social democracy,” a 
welfare state model most common in Scandinavian countries, seeks solidarity in the form of 
“an equality of the highest standards.”  Gösta Esping-Andersen, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism 27, 75 (1990). 
154 Saltman, supra note 25, at 27.  
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While not always the dominant or explicit value behind policies in the 
United States, a desire to collectivize certain risks does influence how we have 
organized important and highly popular American social welfare programs.  
Take the example of Social Security.  The Federal Insurance Contributions Act 
(FICA) mandates that all workers contribute FICA, or payroll taxes, for Social 
Security.155  These dollars are pooled and then redistributed to eligible 
applicants (primarily the disabled and those over sixty-five years old) 
according to a benefits calculation.156  This benefits determination serves a 
progressive redistributive function so that workers with low earnings will have 
sufficient income for retirement.  The lowest 1/5 of earners has a ratio of 
benefits-to-taxes almost three times as high as the top 1/5 of earners.157  We 
(or the working majority of us) all are compelled to pay into a system of 
savings, knowing that we may eventually receive less than we have 
contributed over our lifetime, and perhaps acknowledging the universal 
importance of income security in retirement.  Our contribution ensures that 
both we and the members of our community will enjoy such income security.   
Professor Bill Sage recently reflected that even though solidarity may not 
be the most fashionable of American values, it nonetheless weaves through 
American health policy.158  American health insurance has early roots in more 
solidaristic models, and while the industry has moved further away from 
collective responsibility over the past fifty years, notions of solidarity still 
underlie key elements of American health insurance.159  On the private 
insurance side, group health insurance pools risk among all members of the 
group, and mandated benefit laws promote broader risk pooling for certain 
conditions by requiring all insurance policies issued in a state cover a 
particular condition, as discussed further in III.B.1 below.  And the patchwork 
of social insurance programs discussed in Part I above (e.g., Medicare, 
Medicaid, SCHIP) are based on the notion of ensuring some Americans access 
to medical care, regardless of ability to pay. 
Many have voiced support for the mandate as a tool that can reignite a 
more broad-based solidaristic health insurance system in the U.S.  Scholars 
have recognized mandated insurance as a possible means to expand risk pools 
and spread health risks more collectively.160    
In recent debates, policymakers regularly invoke the value of solidarity in 
support of the mandate.  The Conference Committee report from the 
Massachusetts reform effort explained:  “Requiring those who can afford 
health insurance to purchase coverage is fair . . . . By requiring everyone to 
have coverage, those who are healthy and currently uninsured will enter the 
insurance risk pool and thus help to stabilize the cost of premiums for the 
currently insured.”161  In his speech to Congress on health reform on 
                                                 
155 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
156  See Cong. Budget Office, Econ. and Budget Issue Brief:  Is Social Security 
Progressive? 2 (2006). 
157 Id. at 3.  The progressivity is limited by the fact that higher earners tend to live longer.  
See id. at 5.   
158 William M. Sage, Solidarity: Unfashionable, But Still American, in Connecting 
American Values with Health Reform 10, 10-12 (Mary Crowley ed., 2009). 
159 See Part III.A below. 
160 See, e.g., Mariner, supra note 12, at 205-06; Monahan, supra note 12, at 333-34. 
161 Conference Committee Report, supra note 69, at 4.   
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September 9, 2009, which some credit with reigniting a then diminished 
support for reform, President Obama spoke of late Senator Ted Kennedy and 
notions of solidarity as he asked Americans to act together to reform health 
insurance:  
“That large-heartedness – that concern and regard for the plight of others 
– is not a partisan feeling . . . . It, too, is part of the American character.  Our 
ability to stand in other people's shoes.  A recognition that we are all in this 
together; that when fortune turns against one of us, others are there to lend a 
helping hand . . . . 
This has always been the history of our progress.  In 1933, when over half 
of our seniors could not support themselves and millions had seen their 
savings wiped away, there were those who argued that Social Security would 
lead to socialism.  But the men and women of Congress stood fast, and we are 
all the better for it.  In 1965, when some argued that Medicare represented a 
government takeover of health care, members of Congress, Democrats and 
Republicans, did not back down.  They joined together so that all of us could 
enter our golden years with some basic peace of mind.”162 
Obama’s appeal invokes the value of solidarity by asking Americans to 
stand in others’ shoes to recognize a common plight and to help create 
security for everyone against the costs of poor health.   
The American populace has expressed willingness to act in solidarity with 
respect to health reform.  Americans are clearly concerned with the high 
numbers of uninsured in the country.  A recent poll reports that 94 percent of 
people think it is a very or somewhat serious problem that many Americans 
do not have health insurance.163  And while the American public has at times 
hesitated to embrace health solidarity because of resistance to interpersonal 
redistribution,164 this same poll suggests that this trend may be shifting.  
Nearly 60 percent of those polled said they were willing to pay higher taxes so 
that all Americans have insurance “they can’t lose no matter what.”165     
ii. Normative bases for solidarity and policy design implications  
Advocates for a more solidaristic health insurance system might root their 
support in several different normative justifications.166  Each of these 
justifications would lead to a different vision of how solidarity translates into 
policy, including who and what types of medical care are included within the 
bounds of a system of solidarity.    
Some believe that health is inherently special, and medical care should be 
treated as a merit good, rather than allocated by the market based upon 
                                                 
162 Barack Obama, U.S. President, Health Care Speech to Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), in 
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/politics/10obama.text.html. 
163  CBS News & N.Y. Times Poll, The Debate Over Health Care, at Question 54 (June 12-
16, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/htdocs/pdf/CBSPOLL_June09a_health_care.pdf. 
164 Stone, supra note 12, at 289-90. 
165 CBS News & N.Y. Times Poll, supra note 163, at Question 59. 
166 See, e.g., 1 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Securing Access to Health 
Care: The Ethical Implication of Differences in Availability of Health Services 
(1983) [hereinafter President’s Commission]; Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health Care 
Morally, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1449 (1994) (providing framework of moral arguments for treating 
health differently); Norman Daniels, Just Health Care 36-58 (Daniel I. Wikler ed., 1985).  
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ability and willingness to pay.167  Variations of this argument include, for 
example, that health is necessary to exercise rights of citizenship,168 for 
achieving personal satisfaction or happiness,169 or to obtain reasonable 
opportunities in life.170  In other words, some believe health is a foundational 
need and for this reason support a norm of more equitable access to medical 
care.171  This view might align with a Rawlsian conception of factors that 
should not limit access to benefits of society.172   
Alternatively, others experience moral guilt from allowing another person 
to suffer173 and thus believe we should act in solidarity out of “empathy-
altruism.”174  For example, as evinced by the existence of EMTALA, many of us 
would not allow someone to bleed to death after a car accident because he is 
uninsured or unable to pay for care.  A mandate could thus serve to prevent 
some from suffering from lack of care and others from experiencing distress 
because of such suffering.175  
These above two justifications would lead to a fairly unbounded 
conception of health solidarity and thus a broad system of health 
redistribution.  In other words, such views would support a solidaristic system 
where we collectively fund treatment for sickness or injury for anyone, 
regardless of the source or cause, if the sickness or injury is an impediment to 
certain basic opportunities, or if it causes suffering.  Yet proponents of each of 
these views would have a different priority for spending health care dollars.  
For example, someone who subscribes to health as a means to life’s 
opportunities might prefer to address health problems that tend to affect the 
young with a world of opportunity ahead.  They might believe we should first 
focus on vaccination and well-child care before addressing, for example, 
diseases of the elderly.  In contrast, the empathy altruist would want to spend 
dollars to alleviate the greatest or most visible medically-related suffering. 
Finally, a luck egalitarian might support solidarity out of a belief that no 
one should suffer the arbitrary, expensive misfortune of poor health, which 
disproportionately burdens a small proportion of all Americans.176  
Circumstances that evoke solidarity for a luck egalitarian could be a result of 
                                                 
167 See, e.g., President’s Commission, supra note 166, at 16-17; Daniels, supra note 166, 
at 11-18; Gostin, supra note 12, at 34-37; Nichols, supra note 146, at 176; Stone, supra note 12, 
at 288. 
168 See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 12, at 13. 
169 Id.  
170 See, e.g., Daniels, supra note 166, at 39-47. 
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determinant of health.  Solidarity simply grows out of the belief that it is an important 
determinant of good health.   
172 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971). 
173 See Elhauge, supra note 166, at 1483-84. 
174 See Lester, supra note 150, at 25. 
175 Cf. Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 Phil. & Pub. 
Aff. 55, 69-70 (1984) (making a related argument for enforced beneficence to coordinate 
health-related charity desires toward the most effective uses in building infrastructure or 
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176 One must believe that to some degree, we cannot control or foresee health risk, which 
is, of course, only partially true.  It might be easiest to believe that health is arbitrary with 
respect to genetic factors of illness.  Cf. Onora O’Neill, Genetic Information and Insurance: 
Some Ethical Issues, 352 Phil. Transactional: Biological Sci. 1087 (1997) (arguing that it 
is not reasonable to differentiate premiums on the basis of unavoidable genetic risk). 
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one’s underlying health endowment (e.g., congenital problems or bad genes) 
or of idiosyncratic health status (e.g., resulting from a car accident).  Medical 
care costs are distributed so that in any year a small number of people 
experience tremendously high medical expenses, while most people 
experience little to no expenses.177  One percent of the population accounts for 
over 25 percent of total health care spending in a year ($43,000 per person in 
2005), and ten percent of the population are responsible for almost 70 
percent of all medical spending in a year.178  Yet this population of top 
spenders changes from year to year.  One study estimated that 62 percent of 
the top ten percent of spenders in 1996 were not in the top ten percent in 
1998.179  A luck egalitarian would believe that because any of us might be a top 
spender in any one year and often for reasons out of our control, we should 
share communally in the costs of this arbitrary and significant risk.180   
However, luck egalitarianism must lead to a bounded sense of solidarity 
because notions of solidarity would end when someone chooses to act in a way 
that increases her health risk.  Poor health could be caused by factors ranging 
from those completely out of an individual’s control (e.g., genetics) to those 
that may be more in his control (e.g., smoking, drinking, eating poorly).  A 
luck egalitarian might be willing to act in solidarity to help someone with a 
congenital disease or genetic problem.  Yet, if two people are born with the 
same level of risk but the first eats fast food for lunch every day and develops 
heart disease and the second does not, the luck egalitarian might believe it is 
unfair to ask the healthy person to subsidize medical care for the fast-food 
eater’s heart disease.  Similarly, if one person chooses to live in an area where 
health care is expensive (e.g., Boston) and another chooses to live in an area 
where it is not (e.g., Minnesota), they might deem it unfair to ask the person 
in Minnesota to subsidize the one in Boston’s expensive care. 
Under a luck-egalitarian’s policy, some people would thus bear more cost 
than others to the extent they make choices that increase the total overall 
medical care costs for society.  Their behavior may be contrary to underlying 
justifications for redistribution.  If we were to deem that certain actions, such 
as living in an expensive medical care locale or eating poorly, were to 
disqualify someone from enjoying the full benefits of others’ solidarity, we 
could design insurance plans that charge higher deductibles or premiums if 
someone engages in a particular risk-increasing behavior.  By doing so, we 
both express social disapproval of certain behaviors or choices and 
simultaneously might deter them.   
                                                 
177 Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health Care Expenditures, 
Revisited, 20 Health Aff. 9, 12 (2001); Hall, supra note 177, at 3-4.  See, e.g., 47 Million and 
Counting: Why the Health Care Marketplace is Broken: Hearing Before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Finance, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Mark A. Hall, J.D., Fred D. and 
Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake Forest University) available 
at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2008test/061008MHTest.pdf (testified that 
the key challenge in reform is to “place people into large groups whose membership is not tied 
to health risk, and to limit the choice of plans within the group.”). 
178 Berk & Monheit, supra note 177,at 12; Hall, supra note 177, at 3-4.  
179 Berk & Monheit, supra note 177, at 12. 
180 Stone, supra note 12, at 292.  See also Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, True 
Security: Rethinking American Social Insurance (1999).   
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On the other hand, the determinants of such life “choices” or behaviors 
that increase medical risk may in fact be more complex.  Studies on these 
“social determinants of health” have established that factors such as lack of 
education, poverty, and characteristics of one’s environment are highly 
correlated with poor health behaviors.181  Because these factors are largely out 
of one’s control and make it more likely someone will smoke or eat unhealthy 
foods, even a luck egalitarian might not want to penalize this person for 
damage to his health resulting from such actions.  
Thus, even those who support health redistribution as a means to 
promoting health solidarity might disagree on how to define what types of 
medical risks must be shared within the bounds of a system of solidarity, 
depending on their underlying normative belief for why health solidarity is 
important.  Although the particular place where we bound solidarity is a 
complex consideration, it does not bear on the underlying value many see for 
the individual mandate in terms of promoting solidarity.  What is important is 
that under a solidarity-based system, such limits would be agreed upon 
communally, rather than delegated to and determined by insurers on the basis 
of profitability.  
iii. Institutional construction of solidarity 
This final section briefly explores the notion that implementation of a 
system of health redistribution, if successful, can endogenously grow solidarity 
– an idea I will return to briefly in Part IV, even though a full discussion of 
this idea is beyond the scope of this article.  In other words, the question I 
pose is whether an individual mandate – if able to achieve broad health 
redistribution and provide all Americans access to medical care when in 
need– can grow democratic legitimacy for the notion of collectivizing risk in 
the name of more equitable access to medical care.  Long-term and strong 
public support for similar redistributive programs of shared risk and social 
benefit, such as Medicare and Social Security, suggest that the notion is at 
least plausible.  If true, the mandate’s ability to promote broad health 
redistribution might in fact enhance its long-term legitimacy and 
sustainability. 
It is perhaps paradoxical to consider compelling someone to act in 
solidarity by mandate.  Even if a majority would choose to act in solidarity, the 
participation of the oppositional minority is still necessary for the mandate to 
achieve its objectives.  Use of a mandate coerces the minority in the name of 
the majority’s collective desire to achieve such objectives.    
But longer term, the need for such coercion might diminish if a mandate 
that institutionalizes solidarity is able to shift norms that have been 
established by traditions of market-based distribution and individualism 
toward norms of collective responsibility; that is to say, a mandate might 
redefine what we consider individual versus collective responsibility.  
Professor Tom Baker calls this the “social construction of responsibility.”182  
For example, establishing Medicare and requiring participation in it might 
                                                 
181 See generally Jonathan S. Feinstein, The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status 
and Health: A Review of the Literature, 71 The Milbank Q. 279 (1993).   
182 Baker & Simon, supra note 12, at 47.   
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gradually change how we determine who is responsible for providing health 
care for the elderly and might even result in growing favor for the program 
over time.183  The institutions may need to come first, and broad support may 
follow.   
At the most basic level, it is reasonable to believe that an individual 
mandate, because of required high participation, is likely to create investment 
in the program among participants and other interested parties.184  Such 
investment could work to the benefit of the individual mandate if the invested 
parties are satisfied with the benefits the mandate generates and want to 
preserve such benefits.  For example, in Massachusetts, aligning all interest 
groups around the initial health reform, aimed at enhancing coverage by 
individual mandate, has lubricated discussion of cost-cutting efforts, which 
had historically proven quite thorny, because such efforts are now perceived as 
necessary to preserve progress made to date on reform.185  The concentration 
of interests may have also prompted the media spotlight on anti-competitive 
behavior among the Commonwealth’s insurers and providers that contributed 
to rising medical costs in the state.186  With such problems exposed, invested 
parties have the knowledge and incentive to address them to preserve the 
fiscal sustainability of reform.187   
But is it possible that a system of collective participation and mutual aid 
could do more than motivate coordinated political action because of sunk 
costs?  Could it enhance the long-term legitimacy of sharing risk?  In 
describing social health insurance programs in Europe, Richard Saltman calls 
them a “way of life,” engendering great loyalty, suggesting there is at least 
some level of attachment to, if not deeper connection with, European social 
insurance programs.188  
Scholars of the sociology of insurance and of the welfare state contend 
that the way we design our insurance institutions bears greatly on the way 
that we think about suffering and responsibility189 and can enhance the 
perceived legitimacy of using of social programs and insurance to spread 
                                                 
183 Over three-quarters of Americans now support Medicare and Social Security, even 
through many pay more into these programs than they will ever collect in benefits.  Harris 
Interactive, The Harris Poll, Poll #92 (Dec. 21, 2005), 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=620.  Support for Social 
Security has grown from 68% in 1936, when enacted, to as high as 86% in the late 1990s.  
Matthew C. Price, Justice Between Generations: The Growing Power of the Elderly 
in America 82-83 (1997).   
184 Lester, supra note 150, at 15.  On the flip side, such investment could be seen as 
stickiness that might preserve a bad program just as easily as a good one.   
185 Jon Kingsdale, Implementing Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Strategic Lessons 
Learned, 28 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w588, w592 (May 28, 2009).  
186 Partners HealthCare, the largest group of providers in the Commonwealth, has been 
accused of demanding high rates from insurers in return for inclusion in the insurer’s network.  
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Nov. 16, 2008, at A1. 
187 Kingsdale, supra note 185, at w589-90 (discussing the importance of cost containment 
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188 Saltman, supra note 25, at 6.   
189 See e.g., Embracing Risk (Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon eds., 2002); Hunter, supra 
note 9, at 57; Simon, supra note 16, 787-95.     
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economic risks.190   Tom Baker calls this the “use of risk in the social 
construction of reality.”191  He writes:   
“The development of insurance institutions shapes, in turn, what 
is imaginable about the meaning of participation in insurance 
institutions.  The more that insurance institutions adapt to satisfy 
self-interest, the more the satisfaction of self interest will seem to 
be the natural role of insurance institutions and the more far-
fetched the idea of using insurance to achieve solidarity . . . . The 
debate over the government’s role in the U.S. health insurance is, 
in significant part, a debate over the nature of health insurance: 
does it exist to protect me and mine, or does it serves a greater 
good?192” 
Deborah Stone suggests that insurance not only shapes our notions of 
insurance but also shapes larger culture and behavior:  “Insurance is a social 
institution that helps define norms and values in political culture, and 
ultimately shapes how citizens think about issues of membership, community, 
responsibility, and moral obligation.”193  Conversely, Jonathan Simon suggests 
that actuarial practices that limit risk pooling “construct groups along 
dimensions that erode the basis of collective identity and action.”194 
By this logic, the mandate, if successful at health redistribution, might 
affirm a conception of health insurance as an institution where all should 
share collectively in risk to achieve a social good.  The institution itself might 
construct a reality in which it is more likely for someone to favor (or at least 
not oppose) health redistribution. 
Gillian Lester’s recent article considers whether universal social welfare 
programs might be able to actuate altruism endogenously in a way that would 
ease constraints on redistribution.195  She considers possible mechanisms 
through which a universal program might do so, based upon its ability to 
create the conditions that studies in psychology and economics have identified 
that tend to invoke altruism.196  Altruism might grow, for example, from a 
sense of reciprocal benefit from, and stewardship over, a shared program197 or 
from “empathy-altruism,” when someone identifies with needs of another, 
which is most likely to occur when both people are members of a salient 
group.198   
In contrast, using means-tested programs and income taxes to effect 
redistribution may be solidarity-diminishing over time.  Sociologist Gösta 
                                                 
190 Cf. Baker & Simon¸ supra note 12, at 46; Esping-Anderson, supra note 153, at 66-
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Esping-Anderson writes that means-tested programs draw a line between the 
haves, who are self-sufficient, and the have-nots, who are not.199  There is no 
longer one community working toward a goal but rather a clear distinction 
between those in need and the others who pay to fulfill their need.200  These 
types of distinctions create potential for devolution into stratification and 
negative stereotypes, such as the “Welfare Queen,” that erode solidarity and 
may in fact threaten the legitimacy of social welfare programs in the long-
term, as the Welfare Queen did for Aid For Dependent Children (AFDC).201  
Early public surveys hint at the possibility of slowly shifting norms in 
Massachusetts.  Public support of the individual mandate has grown from 52 
percent in 2006, when the reform was passed, to 58 percent in 2008, post-
implementation.202  Support for the overall reform grew over the same period 
from 61 to 69 percent.203  While the cause of this increased support is not 
clear, it is possible residents are growing comfortable with the idea of 
belonging to a shared system under the mandate.204  Thus, by collectivizing 
risk among all Americans and providing, in return, access to care when in 
need, it is possible to conceive that the individual mandate might catalyze a 
more solidaristic way of conceptualizing health insurance.  Over time, doing 
so might grow public legitimacy and durability of a system of universal 
coverage reliant on interpersonal redistribution.         
D. Compliance and Measuring Success 
Evaluations of the individual mandate have relied upon percent 
compliance, which is a measure of the number of uninsured converted into 
consumers of health insurance, to gauge whether the mandate is successful.205  
When equating compliance with success, most experts project that an 
individual mandate will in fact succeed,206 as evinced by results in 
Massachusetts, where three years into implementation of the mandate nearly 
98% of the state’s residents are insured.207 
                                                 
199 Esping-Andersen, supra note 153, at 64-65. 
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While compliance is an important measure of success, it is an insufficient 
measure of the mandate’s ability to achieve the three different potential 
objectives, explored in this proceeding Part. 208  Compliance primarily 
measures the mandate’s impact on uninsured as consumers (or non-
consumers) of health insurance.  Thus, it can at best reflect success on 
objectives that rely primarily upon the mandate’s ability to convert the 
uninsured into consumers of health insurance.  
Paternalism and efficiency objectives depend largely on the mandate’s 
ability to convert the uninsured into consumers of insurance.  This is not to 
say that the mandate’s influence over financiers and ability to promote health 
redistribution has no bearing on these objectives, because it certainly does.  It 
is only to say that if the mandate were to lead to universal coverage, 
paternalism and efficiency objectives would be met with some reasonable level 
of success. 
High compliance serves as a reasonable proxy for paternalistic goals, so 
long as insurance coverage provides sufficient health and financial protection 
to make purchasing it of value to the insured.  With a significant and growing 
problem of underinsurance, as the cost of insurance increases, it will be more 
difficult for insurance to provide such protection as some would hope.  For 
example, if a low-income purchaser buys a high deductible policy, where he 
must pay the first $5000 in expenses out-of-pocket, it is possible he won’t be 
able to afford to access medical care or will face financial problems if he does 
obtain necessary care and is billed for the $5000 deductible.  Likewise, if a 
policy carves out certain conditions or caps coverage at low limits, the same 
may occur.  To the extent these problems are exacerbated by fragmentation 
and not just by problems inherent in the high cost of medical care translated 
into insurance premiums, paternalistic objectives might also face problems 
due to the fragmentation discussed below.209   
Compliance also provides some (albeit imperfect) measure of the ability of 
the individual mandate to increase efficiency.  The link between compliance 
and increased efficiency is more tenuous because efficiency first relies upon 
individuals becoming consumers of insurance but also relies in part on 
behavioral shifts by insureds and insurers.  For example, to reduce 
inefficiencies from inappropriate use of ER care, the newly insured must use 
                                                                                                                      
Blumberg, Urban Inst., Massachusetts Health Reform: Solving the Long-Run Cost 
Problem 2-3 (2009). 
208 Low compliance may also be a sign that a mandate was not well-implemented, not 
necessarily of fundamental mandate failure, as discussed in a recent article by Professor Sherry 
Glied and colleagues.  Glied et al., supra note 4.  Compliance is a function of at least four 
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209 The interconnection between paternalist goals and fragmentation is complicated.  For 
some, a fragmented market works to their benefit if they can obtain inexpensive coverage 
based on their own risk profile. If they are charged more for premiums when risk pools more 
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clinical care when more efficient.210  Similarly, perfect compliance eliminates 
the possibility of adverse selection into health insurance markets and thus 
should eliminate the standard lemons pricing effect, so long as insurers 
respond to the lower average risk of insureds by lowering the price of the 
average premium accordingly.     
Compliance, on the other hand, is a necessary yet entirely insufficient 
measure of the mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution.  
Compliance is a precondition; at the most basic level, everyone must 
participate so that insurance can be used as the mechanism to pool risk for 
everyone.  Yet compliance entirely fails to gauge the impact of the mandate on 
the uninsured as financiers of care.  Understanding whether the mandate’s 
influence over potential financiers does in fact result in effective health 
redistribution relies upon understanding how well the financiers pool risk and 
fund medical costs for those sicker then themselves.   
Thus, reliance so far in the literature on compliance to measure the 
individual mandate’s success has particularly obscured the mandate’s 
potential, and I argue certain failure, to promote redistributive objectives and 
capture the anticipated benefits from doing so.  In Part III of this paper, I will 
show that the fragmentation of insurance markets makes it structurally 
impossible for the mandate to promote health redistribution, even in the case 
of perfect compliance.   Unless fragmentation is understood and addressed, 
the best a mandate could do would be to serve paternalist objectives and to 
capture some part of the efficiencies possible.   
IV. THE PROBLEM OF MARKET FRAGMENTATION AND FAILED 
HEALTH REDISTRIBUTION 
Fragmentation of health insurance markets on the basis of risk is a well-
documented phenomenon of the American health insurance system.211  This 
section does not reveal a novel story of fragmentation but rather augments the 
stories that have been told in the literature to date in two ways.  First, it 
provides a summary retelling to reveal the full extent of both market-based 
and regulatory fragmentation of the health insurance market.  Second, it 
analyzes how fragmentation will cause the individual mandate to fail to 
achieve health redistribution (and to some extent limit its ability to fully 
achieve paternalistic and efficiency objectives) because fragmentation limits 
mechanisms for pooling risk and broadly distributing medical costs.   
To the extent the mandate fails to achieve health redistribution, it will 
clearly be unable to seize upon the benefits described above that may result 
from it, including creating a more solidaristic model of health insurance.  
Furthermore, a mandate without health redistribution will draw more people 
                                                 
210 So far in Massachusetts, emergency department (ED) use for non-emergencies has not 
decreased.  Sharon K. Long & Paul B. Masi, Access and Affordability: An Update on Health 
Reform in Massachusetts, Fall 2008, 28 Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w578, w583 (2009).  
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211 See, e.g., Austin, supra note 16; Hunter, supra note 9 (showing that health law as a field 
is in fact structured around principles of risk allocation); Light, supra note 16; Stone, supra 
note 12. 
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into a system where some (likely those who are poorer or less healthy) face a 
disproportionately high cost to comply with the mandate.212   
Below, I describe how insurance market competition has caused 
fragmentation and how regulation has both exacerbated and entrenched 
fragmentation.  Finally, I summarize the bottom-line impact of this 
fragmentation on the mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution, 
drawing evidence from reform in Massachusetts.213    
A. Market-Driven Fragmentation and the Rise of Actuarial Risk 
Rating 
Fragmentation of the insurance markets grew first and foremost out of a 
shift from a model of insurance built upon ideals of solidarity to one where 
competition between commercial insurers is based upon actuarial risk rating 
and risk selection.214  In the early twentieth century, Blue Cross (hospital) and 
Blue Shield (medical) plans offered open enrollment and community rating, 
where each group’s insurance premium is based upon average expected costs 
in their broader community, enabling the risks and costs of poor health to be 
shared among all members of the community.215  Blue Cross organizations 
began to lose market share when commercial for-profit insurers offered 
premiums based upon a group’s actual use of medical expenses.216  This 
practice allowed groups with healthier-than-average employees to buy 
insurance less expensively.217  The commercial insurers selected out (i.e., 
cherry-picked) low-risk groups and left the Blues with higher-risk groups.  As 
a result, the Blues’ average expected costs per subscriber increased, forcing 
them to increase premiums and causing a business model based on 
community rating to struggle.218   
And thus began the ascendance of actuarial risk rating, where insurers 
price premiums for an individual or group so that if risk-rating formulas 
accurately predicted experienced costs (which is debated219), each enrollee or 
group would finance its own medical expenses – a concept of insurance 
antithetical to solidarity because each individual (or group) is presumed 
                                                 
212 See Alan Weil, Increments Toward What?, 20 Health Aff. 68, 72 (2001).  See also 
sources cited supra note 211 (discussing social stratification effects of risk classification 
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Medicaid § 1115 waiver.  Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Andres Torres, Universal Health Care in 
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219 See e.g., Simon supra note 16, at 784. 
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responsible for only his (or its) own expected risk.  Professor Baker 
characterizes it as a model with an “individualistic conception of self-interest . 
. . as the foundation of health insurance.”220  In this model, insurers’ profit is 
based on their ability to predict risk accurately and to avoid high-risk (i.e., 
“uninsurable”) beneficiaries.221  To maximize profit, an insurer seeks to avoid 
the subscriber who will cost $50,000 and attract as many as possible who will 
cost little to nothing.   
This section describes the two major ways competition between 
commercial insurers has driven fragmentation.  First, insurers have divided 
the market into three primary sub-markets – large group, small group, and 
individual.  With this structural fragmentation, risk does not pool among the 
different markets.  Second, in the individual (and less so the small group 
market), insurers profit based upon their ability to actuarially rate and design 
policies to individualize risk.  This means that higher-risk individuals (or 
groups) bear higher costs, and the highest-risk individuals (or groups) may be 
excluded from coverage altogether and thus absorb out-of-pocket the full cost 
of any health problems they might encounter, as explained below. 
1. Structural Fragmentation into Three Sub-Markets  
  The method for risk selection differs among large groups, small groups, 
and individual customers.  Insurance carriers thus created three different 
submarkets along these lines, and each insurer generally only operates within 
one of these three sub-markets.222  As discussed above, selecting out the 
healthy members is not important for large groups, where insurers are better 
able to price premiums accurately in accordance with a group’s overall risk.  
Within group insurance, each member generally pays the same premium for a 
plan based upon average group member risk, as required by federal law, so 
that the cost of medical care for the group is pooled and shared equally among 
all members.223  Healthy members counterbalance the $50,000 beneficiary so 
the insurer is less concerned that there are likely to be expensive members 
within a group.  Insurers can fairly accurately determine the expected costs for 
the group and thus the premium to charge; they then adjust that premium 
over time based upon the group’s actual expenses.  
In contrast, in the individual market, where applicants seek insurance on 
their own, premiums are based upon an individual’s (or family’s) own 
expected risk.  If an insurer presumes an individual to be high-risk, it will 
subject him to high premiums, limited coverage (e.g., carve outs for pre-
existing conditions or low coverage limits), or may even deny him coverage, to 
the extent allowed by a state’s laws on insurance issuance and pricing.224   
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The small group market is a hybrid between the large group and 
individual markets.  All members in a small group are subject to the same 
premium, which means that a small group pools risk among its members the 
same way a large group does.  However, insurers often treat a small group 
more like an individual applicant, underwriting the risk of individual 
members and designing or pricing policies in line with individual members’ 
risk.  This is because in a small group, one or two very high-risk individuals 
might make it difficult for an insurer to write insurance profitably.    
Thus, at the most basic level of fragmentation, insurers created three sub-
markets in order to manage the different nature of risk in each.  As noted 
above, with the creation of these three sub-markets, risk is no longer pooled at 
all across the large group, small group, and individual markets. This means 
that people in the large group market do not share in the risk of poor health of 
those in the individual market, causing a problem for health redistribution 
that I will tease out in subsection 3 below.225   
2. Fragmentation of the Individual Market on the Basis of Individual Risk  
Fragmentation also occurs within each of these three markets in a way 
that limits or defines who will share risk with whom, and to what degree, 
within each sub-market.  In particular, as described above, the nature of 
actuarial risk rating in the individual (and less so the small group) market is 
the epitome of fragmentation and is a frequent subject of study by economics, 
public health, and health law scholars.226  A perfectly risk-rated system would 
charge each individual the exact price of her own expected medical care, plus 
administrative costs and profit.  Thus, the more precisely actuarial formulas 
attempt to predict and divide up medical expenditures, the less risk will pool 
among individual enrollees.  The entire structure of an actuarially-rated 
individual market attempts to minimize health redistribution among 
enrollees.  This way, insurers can attract those who are perceived as low-risk 
with the lowest premiums possible because they are only charged for their 
own expected costs, which are by definition low.227   
As noted above, insurers limit risk pooling (i.e., charge individuals 
premiums based upon their own risk) through a number of risk selection and 
pricing mechanisms to the extent allowed by state insurance regulation.228  
For a high-risk applicant, an insurer might quote a premium higher than the 
standard rate for a particular product, limit the scope of coverage by carving 
out certain conditions or capping benefits, or deny coverage altogether. All of 
these practices cause beneficiaries who are deemed higher-risk to pay higher 
                                                 
225 See How Private Health Coverage Works, supra note 102, at 7. 
226  See, e.g., Austin, supra note 16; Hunter, supra note 9 (showing that health law as a 
field is in fact structured around principles of risk allocation); Light, supra note 16; Stone, 
supra note 12.   
227 Of course, this expectation does not necessarily translate into low costs. 
228 While it is difficult to generalize about risk selection practices because different 
practices are permitted or prohibited state-by-state, no state prohibits all risk selection.  For 
an overview of state laws on risk-selection practices, see the Henry J. Kaiser Family 
Foundation Statehealthfacts.org Website, 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparecat.jsp?cat=7 (last visited Mar. 5, 2010) (data on 
regulation in states’ small group and individual markets) [hereinafter Statehealthfacts.org].    
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prices and limit the extent that their risk is pooled with healthier applicants in 
the individual market, who pay lower prices for the same or better coverage.229   
This is not to say that there is no risk pooling of premiums in the 
individual market.  Some states force risk pooling through laws, such as 
community rating laws, that require everyone within a community be charged 
the same or similar premiums, rate bands that restrict the variance in 
premium prices, pre-existing condition laws that prohibit insurers from 
excluding certain conditions when issuing insurance, and guaranteed issue 
laws that require insurers to take all comers.230  Even without such laws, 
Economists Mark Pauly and Bradley Herring have identified some pooling 
occurs across members within the individual market.  Their research revealed 
that while individual market premium prices increase with risk, they increase 
less than proportionately. 231 They hypothesize this pooling occurs because of 
insurers’ diminishing returns from actuarial rating and from assumption of 
the ability to smooth premiums across an individual’s lifetime following 
enactment of required guaranteed renewal of policies under HIPAA.232  
Finally, even if premiums are charged based upon expected risk, actual 
expenditures may deviate in a way that leads naturally to ex-post pooling of 
realized medical costs.  Yet, even with some pooling in the individual market, 
scholars generally agree it is significantly less than in group markets.233   
Any such limitations to risk pooling result in a situation where higher-risk 
applicants in the individual market are more vulnerable to not being able to 
access care when in need than similarly situated applicants in group markets.  
As discussed above, the process of risk selection results in high overhead costs 
that make the individual market coverage relatively more expensive, as 
compared to group market coverage.  The small group and individual markets 
often have higher load factors and less generous policies.234  These overhead 
costs and higher premiums for some result in more people priced out of the 
individual market and other people, who obtain insurance, paying relatively 
more for coverage.   
In 2005, nearly 3 in 5 adults who applied for coverage in the individual 
market failed to find a plan they could afford because they were denied 
coverage, charged higher prices, or had a health problem excluded from 
coverage.235  One study found that in states with little individual market 
                                                 
229 Without mandated benefits as part of coverage, fragmentation could also result in a 
less obvious way by limiting risk pooling for a particular condition.  If a condition is included 
in one policy but not another, risk does not pool among the policy holders for such a condition.  
See supra Part B. 
230 See Statehealthfacts.org, supra note 228. 
231 Mark V. Pauly & Bradley Herring, Pooling Health Insurance Risks 21, 33-38 
(1999); Mark V. Pauly & Bradley Herring, Risk Pooling and Regulation: Policy and Reality in 
Today’s Individual Health Insurance Market, 26 Health Aff. 770, 770 (2007).  See also Vip 
Patel & Mark V. Pauly, Guaranteed Renewability and the Problem of Risk Variation in 
Individual Health Insurance Markets, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) w280 (2002) 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w2.280v1/DC1 (arguing guaranteed 
renewability increases pooling in the individual market).   
232  See Pauly & Herring, supra note 231. 
233 See, e.g., Beeuwkes Buntin et al., supra note 224 (contending that poor pooling is a 
significant problem in the individual market). 
234 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 574-75. 
235 Collins et al., supra note 57, at 4. 
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regulation, as many as 30-40 percent of applicants are rejected for 
coverage.236  Finally, while half of adults with employer-sponsored coverage 
rate their coverage as excellent or good, only one-third of those with 
individual market coverage do so.237  Thus, this fragmentation creates a 
market where some people will pay more for the same or less access to 
medical care than others, and those who are most in need of care might be 
shut out of insurance markets.    
B. Regulatory-Based Fragmentation and Inequities 
At the same time, regulation has exacerbated fragmentation within both 
public and private insurance.  As explained in this section, regulatory 
fragmentation has occurred intentionally through the creation of partial social 
insurance and, perhaps less intentionally, with passage of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and through tax subsidies 
for group insurance.   
1. Regulatory Exacerbation of Fragmentation 
First, Medicare and Medicaid offered an incremental approach to social 
health insurance, creating an initial divide between public and private 
insurance as a compromise position following an unsuccessful effort to create 
national health care in the mid-twentieth century.238  With the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid, Congress, in one fell swoop, lifted the most expensive 
populations (the elderly and poor disabled) out of private insurance risk pools, 
making a decision to fund their health insurance through tax revenues.  
Elderly and disabled populations are now isolated into pools where the 
average cost per beneficiary is high.   
Although taking high-risk populations and providing them with care 
regardless of ability to pay is desirable for many reasons, doing so has 
nonetheless largely limited their ability to pool risk with lower-risk 
individuals.239  This means that the health costs of the highest-risk 
populations are not shared society-wide through health redistribution but 
rather are funded by wealthier taxpayers or through payroll contributions.  
Such an approach to providing access to medical care, regardless of ability to 
pay, singles out high-risk groups for differential treatment, maintains a high 
                                                 
236 Id. at 21.   
237 Id. at 4. 
238 See Daschle et al., supra note 2, at 47-50, 61-64. For a rich discussion of the politics 
that led to the creation of Medicare, see Theodore R. Marmor, The Politics of Medicare 
(2d ed. 2000).  The compromise reached by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and Ways and 
Means Chairman, Wilbur Mills became law in 1965 as Medicare Parts A and B and Medicaid.  
Id. at 31-56.  In 1997, Congress authorized the State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) to extend coverage to children in families with income too high to qualify for 
Medicaid but unable to obtain or afford private health insurance coverage.  The Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, Title XXI State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), Pub. L. 
105-33, H.R. 2015, 105th Congress (1997). 
239 Medicaid does pool the expensive disabled beneficiaries with some healthy 
beneficiaries, including poor children and their parents, who are inexpensive.  Yet, even with 
the presence of children in the risk pools, the average cost remains high because Medicaid 
covers expensive benefits for the disabled, including long term care.   
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average cost per person, and creates a system, particularly in Medicaid, where 
high costs are borne more narrowly by wealthier taxpayers.   
In the private insurance market, the McCarran-Ferguson Act resulted in 
two main types of fragmentation.  The first is geographical fragmentation.  
McCarran-Ferguson protected state insurance regulation from unintended 
intrusion of the federal government.240  With insurance regulation the realm 
of the states, each state has developed its own health insurance rules and 
market.  Different carriers compete in each state, different rules apply to each 
market in each state, and risk doesn’t effectively pool across state lines for the 
most part.241   
Second, fragmentation has also resulted from an interplay between the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act and ERISA that motivated many large employers to 
self-fund their health insurance plans and, in so doing, extract their 
employees into their own risk pool.  McCarran-Ferguson prompted an 
increase in insurance regulation by states freed from concerns of 
preemption.242  One form such state-level regulation has taken is mandated 
benefit laws, which require all insurance plans to include particular (typically 
expensive) medical conditions as a standard benefit.243  The intended result of 
such a law is to spread the cost of treating that mandated condition among all 
insured in a state – essentially risk pooling at the level of a particular 
condition.244   
However, such state insurance regulation also laid the groundwork for 
fragmentation of the large group market into self-funded plans following the 
passage of ERISA in 1974, which created uniform requirements for large, 
multi-state companies in administering their employee benefit plans.245  
Through a series of complex judicial interpretations expanding and 
contracting the bounds of its preemption rule, which Professor Nan Hunter 
calls the “ERISA accordion,” ERISA has been interpreted to allow large 
employers to avoid state insurance regulation, including mandated benefit 
laws, by creating self-funded employee benefit health plans.246  As discussed 
                                                 
240 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006).   
241 An insurer’s highest risks might in effect pool across state lines through some carriers’ 
reinsurance policies.   
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Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1361, 1365 (2007). 
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Bunch & J.P. Wieske, Council for Affordable Health Insurance, Health Insurance 
Mandates in the States 2008 (2008). 
244 One study suggests mandated benefits increase the cost of basic health coverage from 
20-50%.  Id. at 1; Amy B. Monahan, The Case for Federalizing Mandated Health Benefits, 32 
Admin. & Reg. L. News 2, 2 (2007). 
245 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
246 Hunter, supra note 9, at 35 (describing ERISA preemption law).  ERISA sets 
standards for employer-sponsored benefit plans, including group health plans, and preempts 
any state law that “relates to” an employer-sponsored benefit plan.  29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
Under New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 
514 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1995), a state law that has a “connection with” an ERISA plan might also 
be preempted.  Yet, ERISA “saves” from preemption those laws that regulate the business of 
insurance. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(a) (2006).  Nonetheless, the “deemer clause” excludes 
employee benefits plans from the savings clause, by providing that ERISA plans, such as self-
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above, in a self-funded (i.e., self-insured) plan, the employer assumes risk for 
its employees instead of buying a “fully-funded” plan from an insurer.  In 
return, the employer can design its plan, including choosing covered benefits, 
so long as it’s in compliance with ERISA.247   
Not surprisingly, following ERISA, there was an upsurge of self-funded 
plans, so that 55 percent of all workers and 77 percent of workers in large 
companies are now in self-funded plans,248 as compared to just 7 percent 1977, 
and thereby segregated out of the broader insurance market.249  That is, in a 
self-funded plan those employees pool their risk only with their co-workers, 
not directly with any other private purchasers.  Furthermore, employers who 
have healthier-than-average employee populations have greater incentive to 
self insure to avoid a situation in which their employees pool risk with and 
subsidize costs for less healthy individuals outside of the company.  Although 
employers with self-funded plans carry reinsurance, which can be seen as a 
mechanism that pools some self-funded plans’ losses, this coverage only pools 
a slice of such losses above the attachment point for the policy. 
With fewer healthy people in the large group insurance pools, the goals of 
regulation, such as mandated benefits laws and health redistribution through 
the individual mandate, which rely upon broad risk pooling, are impeded. 
2. Regulatory Exacerbation of Inequities 
While federal insurance regulation, through HIPAA and tax law, 
augments risk pooling for group plans, it simultaneously exacerbates 
inequities between individual and group markets by not equally facilitating 
risk pooling in the individual market.   
First, Congress passed HIPAA in part to enable people to maintain 
meaningful coverage when moving between jobs (i.e., portability).250  While 
HIPAA has largely achieved this goal for enrollees in group markets, because 
of legislative compromise that limited its scope, it has largely failed to do so in 
the individual market.251  Prior to HIPAA, many states had already begun to 
implement portability requirements for group markets but not for the 
individual market.252  Congress was persuaded to design the federal legislation 
to mirror early state efforts to enable meshing of state and federal 
standards.253   
HIPAA imposes several requirements on health insurers that in essence 
promote risk pooling within group markets.  HIPAA requires that insurers 
“guarantee issue” coverage to any applicant and “guarantee renewability” of 
                                                                                                                      
insured health insurance, “shall [not] be deemed to be an insurance company or any other 
insurer . . . .”  Id. § 1144(b)(2)(b).   
247 For a discussion of ERISA and mandated benefits, see Amy Monahan, supra note 242, 
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policies from year-to-year.254  It limits the scope and duration of pre-existing 
condition exclusions to those conditions where “advice, diagnosis, care, or 
treatment” was provided within six month before enrollment in a new plan. 255  
It also prohibits discrimination in group plans on the basis of health status.256  
These rules together require that insurers cover all members of a group for all 
conditions, preventing limits to pooling that would otherwise result from 
denying, dropping, or carving out coverage of conditions for higher-risk 
applicants within a group.   
While these requirements apply broadly to group insurance, in the 
individual market, the guaranteed issue and pre-existing condition 
requirements apply narrowly to “HIPAA eligible” subscribers, which in reality 
has meant that most people who must rely on individual market coverage do 
not benefit.257  Thus, HIPAA bolsters enrollee risk pooling in the group 
markets by requiring insurers cover all members equitably while doing little 
for those seeking insurance on their own, driving a wider wedge between the 
quality of coverage available to group insured and most individually insured. 
Last, but certainly not least, a critical force that exacerbates inequities among 
group and individual markets is the federal tax subsidy for group policies.  
Federal tax law excludes all dollars spent by employers on group health plans 
from federal income and payroll taxes (including employer and employee 
Social Security and Medicare taxes).258  Tax subsidies on group plans equal a 
35-cent discount on every dollar spent on group health insurance.259  In 
addition, employees’ own contributions toward premiums and cost shares 
(copayments and deductibles) are excludable if paid out of “cafeteria plans.”260   
This subsidy in effect pools part of the risk of members in group insurance 
among all taxpayers, who fund this subsidy.  It has been fodder for heated 
health reform debate because of its size – more than $200 billion per year – 
and its regressive nature.261  Note that this exclusion works regressively in two 
ways.  First, it applies to those with employer-sponsored insurance, who tend 
to be higher earners.262  Second, higher earners are in higher tax brackets and 
thus benefit more from excluded income.   
In most cases, the only federal tax assistance for purchasing an individual 
health insurance policy is the ability for those who itemize expenses to deduct 
medical expenses that exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.263  This 
                                                 
254 Pub. L. No. 104-191 § 101, 110 Stat. 1939 (1996).   
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assistance is structured as a deduction, not an exclusion, so while it reduces 
income tax liability, it does not reduce payroll (FICA) tax liability.264   
Thus, through HIPAA and tax law, the federal government has 
exacerbated inequities that run along lines of market fragmentation.  These 
inequities undermine an individual mandate’s ability to facilitate health 
redistribution and access to care equally in both markets because higher-risk 
enrollees in the individual market will find it relatively harder than similarly 
situated individuals in group markets to obtain and finance coverage that 
provides them with meaningful access to care. 
C. Fragmentation’s Impediments to Health Redistribution with the 
Individual Mandate  
Mandating people join fragmented markets where they will differentially 
bear risk based upon factors such as type of employer or past or anticipated 
future health status is antithetical to the objective of health redistribution, 
whereby costs of medical care are pooled more equitably among all healthy 
and sick insureds.   
For example, at the most basic, structural level, the lack of risk pooling 
between private and public markets and among self-funded plans, large 
group, small group, and individual markets poses a problem for equitable 
health redistribution, unless each of the sub-markets contains a similar 
distribution of healthy and sick insureds.  Without pooling among markets, 
the benefit from the financiers, who have costs lower than premiums, may 
help enrollees in some markets more than others.  If, under the mandate, one 
market were to attract more financiers on average, that market would benefit 
from lower average per enrollee costs and eventually lower premiums.265  For 
example, imagine that following the mandate a large self-funded employer 
enrolls 100 new, healthy members.  Its employees will benefit from the ability 
to pool risk with these new financiers, who will help to subsidize insurance 
premiums for their sicker or less lucky coworkers.266  Their acquisition of 
insurance will do nothing to help enrollees in other pools.  Conversely, public 
programs, for example, are likely to gain additional high-cost enrollees.  The 
cost of these enrollees will not be cushioned by any premium dollars paid by 
newly-insured financiers.   
While it is difficult to be certain how an individual mandate will affect 
distribution of the healthy and sick among each sub-market nationally, it is 
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58 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 36 NO. 1 2010 
 
reasonable to believe the mandate might cause more healthy to enroll in the 
large group market and self-funded plans and sick to enroll individually.  On 
one hand, consider the almost certainly healthier-than-average population 
whom a mandate would compel to enroll in group coverage.  This population 
is comprised of two types of opt-outs.  Some previously declined available 
group coverage.  Anyone who had access to subsidized group coverage and 
who is less healthy than average would have had a strong incentive to enroll 
since their premiums, based upon the average risk of the group, would be 
lower than their own expected risk.  Thus, those who opted-out are likely to be 
healthier than average.  In addition, others may gain access to group coverage 
that is newly sponsored and offered by an employer post-mandate if an 
employer mandate is simultaneously enacted.  Any employer who decides to 
offer new group coverage, rather than opting to meet any contribution 
requirements by subsidizing employees’ purchase in the individual market, 
presumably has an employee group with above-average health.  The employer 
can get more value for its healthy employees by creating their own group plan, 
where they can benefit from low average costs per person.  Thus, the group 
market will likely benefit from an influx of new, healthier-than-average 
enrollees. 
On the other hand, the mandate could simultaneously result in a residual 
population with individual coverage that is less healthy than average.  Some 
part of the population that will join the individual market under a mandate 
has previously been declined coverage or priced out of coverage offered at 
higher than standard premiums.  This population is probably less healthy 
than average and will likely buy into the individual market to comply with a 
mandate.  Thus, as the group market benefits from new financiers, the 
individual market will not feel their benefit and may simultaneously suffer 
from an influx of high-risk enrollees. 
Not surprisingly, early results in Massachusetts demonstrate that the 
mandate has caused uneven distribution of healthy and sick among different 
markets.267  Massachusetts has seen some adverse selection into government-
subsidized plans, and an infusion of healthy into already strong employer 
markets.268  Nearly 60 percent of the newly insured are now enrolled in 
government-subsidized insurance through MassHealth, Massachusetts’ 
Medicaid program, (76,000 new enrollees) or through Commonwealth Care 
(“CommCare”), a new program offering sliding scale subsidies to residents 
who earn below 300 percent of FPL and who do not have access to employer-
sponsored insurance (169,000 new enrollees).269  Contrary to concerns that 
the reform might “crowd out” employer-sponsored insurance, Massachusetts 
has seen the opposite, possibly due to employer mandates, as discussed 
below.270  One hundred and thirty-eight thousand people (35 percent of the 
newly insured) enrolled in private group insurance.271   
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An Urban Institute study shows that healthier insureds in Massachusetts 
are disproportionately enrolled in employer-sponsored plans.272  Of 
Massachusetts non-elderly adults who self-identify as in “good, very good, or 
excellent health,” 84 percent have employer-sponsored insurance. 273  Those 
who self-identify as in “fair or poor health” are enrolled disproportionately in 
public or individual coverage (53 percent), rather than in employer-sponsored 
insurance (47 percent).274  Regardless of whether the mandate created this 
reality or if it was already present before reform, if these polls accurately 
reflect health status, they show that the mandate can only go so far to enable 
risk pooling among the healthy and sick to the extent they belong to different 
risk pools.   
Even if we put the above discussion aside and assume that healthy 
financiers will buy coverage at the same proportion in each market, the health 
redistributive benefits of their doing so will be limited in the individual 
market.  To the extent insurers can still engage in risk selection and 
differential pricing, when healthier people buy insurance in the individual 
market, they will pay lower premiums more in line with their own low 
expected risk, providing few premium dollars to subsidize medical care of 
others.  The converse is that sicker individuals will pay higher premiums (or 
get less valuable coverage) because of their high individual risk.  Furthermore, 
when the voluntary opt-outs buy into the individual market, as much as 30-40 
percent of their premium dollars go toward overhead, leaving less of a surplus 
to fund care for the sick.275  This means that those whom the mandate compels 
to buy insurance in the individual market are less engaged in a system of 
health redistribution – either as financiers or receivers of subsidy – than those 
who belong to a group health plan, where everyone pays the same premium 
for the same plan.   
With such barriers to health redistribution, it is not surprising that an 
individual mandate will fall short of creating a system that enables 
distribution of medical care equitably on the basis of medical need and that 
submarkets with greater fragmentation will be farthest from achieving this 
goal.  Fragmentation has led to a system where some are charged more for less 
coverage – if able to obtain coverage at all – simply because they buy 
insurance in the individual and small group markets, in particular if they 
show any likelihood to need care.  Those insured through their employer pay 
less to access medical care and benefit from beneficial tax treatment and 
employer contributions to premiums.276 Those insured in the individual 
insurance market are likely to receive less access to care while paying 
relatively more.  Forty-three percent of adults in individual plans spend over 
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10 percent of income on health expenses as compared to twenty-four percent 
of those in employer plans.277  Scholars believe that the individual market has 
primarily served as a safety net between periods of employment-based 
insurance.278  Those whom a mandate compels into this market may be forced 
to convert this safety net into more permanent, expensive coverage.    
Fragmentation not only leads to highly variable premium costs, it also 
tends to disadvantage those with lower incomes or who are already sick and 
more likely to be consumers in the more fragmented individual market.  
Enrollees in employer-sponsored group insurance are higher earners on 
average.  Eight of ten higher-wage workers have insurance through their 
employer, as compared to three in ten poor workers.279  And those earning 
under $40,000 a year are more likely to have insurance in the individual 
market.280  In addition, those who are already sick and without employer 
coverage are likely to suffer most from actuarial rating in the individual 
market and may be unable to access insurance in absence of guaranteed issue 
laws.   
A mandate that bolsters the group markets with new low-risk enrollees 
and demands more from the sick and the poor in the individual market to 
comply is counterproductive to the goals of health redistribution.  The 
mandate would, in essence, compel everyone into insurance markets in the 
name of making medical care more accessible to those in need, but because of 
fragmentation, it would not only fail to achieve this goal but also 
disproportionately burden more vulnerable populations. 
V. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IN LIGHT OF FRAGMENTATION 
The solution to the impediments fragmentation presents for the mandate 
is, not surprisingly, defragmentation.  Eliminating fragmentation can reshape 
insurance institutions in a way that accommodates risk pooling and enables 
greater health redistribution, rather than letting the institution, as is, limit the 
way Americans share and distribute risk post-mandate.   
Because of the incentives commercial insurers have to fragment, there are 
three primary ways to eliminate insurance market fragmentation: change 
insurers’ incentives so they profit on a basis other than fragmentation; 
regulate insurers to prohibit fragmentation; or restructure insurance markets 
in a way that eliminates fragmentation, including by expanding the bounds of 
public insurance to replace private insurance for some beneficiaries.   
To be clear, it is certainly possible to eliminate fragmentation in one fell 
swoop by instituting a single payer system like that in Canada or the UK.  
However because this approach is considered politically infeasible in the 
current American political climate, I focus instead on solutions that are more 
compatible with the preservation of private insurance, and, in particular, 
included in or consistent with the approach taken in the Health Reform Law.  
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European countries like Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands show the 
potential to create less fragmented health insurance systems with multiple, 
private payers, so long as insurers are highly regulated and programs are 
carefully designed.281  By saying the solutions discussed below may be more 
feasible than a single payer system is not to suggest they would go 
uncontested; the contentiousness of reform debates over the past year 
illustrate that many of these ideas will generate significant controversy in 
their own right, especially in the charged political climate that appears to have 
taken hold of Congress.   
This article does not intend to describe comprehensively every policy 
solution that could address fragmentation, but rather offers a framework for 
thinking about how a range of policies might work to ameliorate 
fragmentation.  It highlights three categories of solutions that could increase 
the scope and breadth of risk pooling among more heterogeneous populations 
– both healthy and sick – without dismantling private insurance.  The 
solutions are discussed in the order from those that are less politically charged 
to those that are more contested, in large part because of increasing 
disruptiveness to the private markets.  Part A describes the use of incentives to 
discourage private insurers from engaging in risk selection and thus causing 
fragmentation, particularly in the individual market.  Part B outlines 
regulatory solutions that prohibit or reverse fragmentation of markets, such as 
requiring insurers to issue policies to all applicants and charge insureds 
premiums that fall within a certain range of price variation.  The Health 
Reform Law relies on versions of policies from both of these categories of 
solutions.  Finally, Part C examines ways we might  restructure insurance 
markets more fundamentally going forward, such as through merging private 
markets, creation and careful design of exchanges, or expanding public 
insurance in ways that might cover those most harmed by fragmentation.  At 
the end of this section, I suggest that undertaking such policies of 
defragmentation might in fact help shape the legitimacy of health 
redistribution over time.  In other words, I probe whether blurring the lines of 
fragmentation that currently define American limits to risk pooling might 
help reshape American norms regarding, and perhaps preferences for, 
broader distribution of the costs of poor health.   
A. Reducing Insurers’ Incentives to Fragment Markets 
Some policy solutions improve the individual market by reducing 
incentives for risk selection, either through attempts to make insurers less 
sensitive to enrolling high-risk applicants or through ex-post solutions that 
lessen insurers’ exposure if they do enroll a high-cost member.282  The theory 
of such approaches is that they can cause commercial insurers to be less 
concerned about the need to select out good risks and, if effective in doing so, 
can eliminate some expenses associated with such risk selection practices.  
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The Health Reform Law incorporates some of these solutions, mostly in ways 
that will lubricate insurance markets in the short term before more 
comprehensive insurance market regulation becomes effective.283 
One way to reduce risk selection is to lessen the profit possible from 
attracting a healthier mix of enrollees through a practice known as risk 
adjustment of premiums.  The idea is to create a system where insurers are 
compensated more for higher-risk enrollees and less for lower-risk ones so 
that they do not benefit, in theory, from cherry-picking out healthier 
enrollees.  While the enrollees still contribute equally (or on the basis of 
income or wealth) through premiums or taxes, a central administrative body 
pools the contributions and then pays insurers based upon the risk profile of 
their enrollees.  Such risk adjustment is used, for example, in Medicare 
Advantage plans, in some states’ Medicaid managed care plans (including in 
Massachusetts), and in many European countries, including in the 
Netherlands, whose social insurance system uses fairly sophisticated risk-
adjustment formulas.284  Risk adjustment of premiums is included in the 
Health Reform Law for plans that will be sold through state insurance 
exchanges created under the Law.285  However, such efforts at risk adjustment 
can be incomplete if they are not based upon comprehensive information and 
are difficult to administer, particularly if they are comprehensive.286   
Another way states have attempted to limit insurers’ exposure in the 
individual market is through the use of high-risk pools, where the states offer 
plans, typically subsidized, for high-risk enrollees to draw them out of the 
standard private insurance market.287  In theory, if the highest-risk people 
were isolated within high-risk pools, insurers might worry less about enrolling 
outliers.  In practice, these pools may not achieve the desired effect.  Although 
a majority of states have high-risk pools, these pools have only enrolled about 
200,000 people nationally and are chronically underfunded.288  Low 
enrollment has been attributed to long waiting periods for pre-existing 
conditions, limited benefits, and expensive coverage.289   
Further, despite the potential high-risk pools may offer to increase 
efficiency and coverage in the individual market, they might do so at a trade-
off to health redistribution.  Even if effective, such solutions remove the cost 
of the sickest enrollees from insurance pools, lessening the ability of the 
healthy to share in the risk of and to finance care for the sickest in their 
communities within insurance risk pools.  Taxes (either on insurers or the 
public at large) must be used to subsidize high-risk pool coverage, which 
states have found can be difficult pragmatically and politically.290   
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Finally, there are also ex-post solutions that could limit insurers’ exposure 
even if they enroll high-risk insured.  Professor Katherine Swartz has 
championed an expansion of public reinsurance as an alternative way to 
reduce risk selection by limiting the exposure insurers face from exorbitantly 
high costs if they write coverage for a particularly expensive beneficiary.291  
She proposes the government provide excess-of-loss relief, assuming some 
percentage of losses above a certain dollar threshold for a policy.292 This type 
of government reinsurance is incorporated in several ways in the Health 
Reform Law, including as a means to cushion the costs of 55-65-year-olds in 
group plans to incent employers to continue to insure retirees in their group 
plans.293 
Although public reinsurance may reduce the behaviors insurers engage in 
to avoid expensive beneficiaries, it also raises concerns.  Professor Timothy 
Stolzfus Jost argues that such an approach of “backstopping private insurers” 
is not the most efficient way to invest tax dollars in insurance because it 
decreases insurers’ incentives to control health care utilization and cost if such 
costs can be externalized onto the government.294  Swartz believes it is possible 
to preserve incentives for cost control, by requiring insurers retain some 
percentage of the risks above the attachment point for the policy.295  However, 
the two goals of reducing insurers’ incentives to risk select by limiting 
exposure and maintaining their incentives to control utilization are in tension 
with one another.  The greater insurers’ exposure, the more they will both 
want to avoid high-risk individuals and also manage expenditures.  
Conversely, the lower their exposure, the more they will welcome high-risk 
individuals and also have less incentive to manage costs.      
Furthermore, such programs may trigger a Russian doll problem, where 
removing a layer of outliers may not eliminate insurers’ desire to differentiate 
among remaining beneficiaries.  Once the first Russian doll is removed, 
another lies beneath – slightly smaller but remarkably similar.  Likewise, even 
if the costs of the top two percent of most expensive beneficiaries are covered 
by government-funded reinsurance, insurers might then be concerned with 
those in the 95-98 percentiles of spending and continue underwriting and 
marketing to manage these new “highest” risks.  Finally, once the government 
guarantees insurers protection from high risks, it is questionable what value 
insurers add beyond simple administration of policies. 
B. Regulatory Defragmentation of Markets:  Lessons from 
Massachusetts 
Insurance market regulation has been used to require insurers to reduce 
fragmentation within the individual market.  While such regulation is a 
critical element of defragmentation and is an important and significant focus 
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of the Health Reform Law, it might nonetheless prove to be a partial solution 
and a difficult to design and imprecise tool, as evidenced by challenges in 
Massachusetts, highlighted below.296 
1. Insurance Market Regulation and the Connector 
One might consider regulation of private insurers as a counterbalance to 
the benefit insurers enjoy from the individual mandate.  With an individual 
mandate, the government creates a requirement that all Americans obtain 
insurance.  Yet it leaves implementation for the most part in the hands of 
private insurers, who, to whatever degree permitted, design, price, and issue 
the plans that Americans must buy.  This power over design, in essence, 
imbues insurers with a tremendous amount of delegated state power to 
determine the contours of how the mandate is put in place and effects 
Americans.297  Regulations, thus, may be seen as a way to ensure insurers 
implement the mandate consistent with intended legislative objectives, 
including health redistribution. 
Private markets can be regulated to prohibit the risk selection practices 
that fragmented markets in the first place.  Such regulation, which has been a 
part of all federal proposals for reform and is central to the Health Reform 
Law,298 is like navigating a u-turn back toward a Blue Cross, community-rated 
model of health insurance by limiting insurers’ freedom to differentiate 
among applicants based upon risk rating.  
At a minimum, regulation could limit the risk selection practices that 
drive fragmentation in the individual market.  It could do so by requiring that 
insurers in the individual market issue policies to all applicants (guaranteed 
issue), that plans meet minimum benefits standards so that insurers don’t use 
policy design to segment customers by risk, that pre-existing condition 
exclusions are limited, and that applicants pay community-rated premiums.  
All of these types of requirements are included in the Health Reform Law,299 
and many of these changes have been implemented in Massachusetts, whose 
reform effort evinces the ability of regulation to lessen, although not eliminate 
fragmentation.   
Massachusetts implemented several coordinated policies, some regulatory 
and some structural, to increase health redistribution within the individual 
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market and between individual and small group markets and to ameliorate 
inequities in the individual market arising from high overhead and 
inequitable application of tax subsidies.  Even prior to reform, Massachusetts 
was one of the few states both to require that insurers guarantee issue of 
insurance to all applicants and charge modified community rates in its 
individual market.300  Massachusetts’s modified community rating requires 
that the most expensive premium for a plan can be no more than two times 
the least expensive premium for the same plan.301  Further, premiums may 
only vary based upon a limited number of factors, including age, geography, 
and group size.302  Such modified community rating promotes greater, 
although not completely equitable, distribution of medical costs among 
insureds in the individual market.303  The reform further limits differentiation 
through plan design by requiring all plans offered meet certain actuarial 
values.304  
Massachusetts also addressed inconsistencies in tax law between group 
and individual market insurance by enabling purchase of individual market 
plans with pre-tax dollars for more people.305  Massachusetts created the 
Connector, an independent, quasi-governmental agency, which acts as a 
clearinghouse for the purchase of health insurance by small businesses and 
individuals without access to employer-sponsored coverage.306  The legislation 
increased individual purchasers’ access to insurance on a pre-tax basis, by 
requiring that employers with over ten employees sponsor a premium-only 
cafeteria plan, which its employees can use to fund purchase of individual 
insurance with pre-tax dollars through the Connector.307  The benefit of this 
requirement does not extend to those who work for companies with fewer 
than 10 employees, those whose employers don’t comply, or the 
unemployed.308  
2. Limitations of Regulatory Solutions  
While Massachusetts’s reform shows that a more heavily regulated 
insurance industry can provide a stronger foundation for an individual 
mandate to promote health redistribution, particularly in the individual 
market, it also suggests the limits of a regulatory solution.     
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 Massachusetts’s insurance market regulation – while more aggressive 
than most states’ insurance regulations at eliminating risk selection – did not 
close the door on such practices, and certain populations still bear more of the 
cost of reform.  Two percent of the population was exempted from the 
mandate on “affordability” grounds because the costs of available coverage 
equaled more than ~7.5-10.5% of their take-home income.309  One population 
particularly vulnerable to exemption is middle-income 55-65 year olds, who 
don’t quality for subsidies and could be subject to relatively high premiums 
under the modified community rating rules, which allow older insureds to be 
charged twice as much as younger insureds for a policy.310  One study reported 
that in December, 2008 the least expensive plan for a middle-income 56-year-
old could cost as much as $9,872 in total annual costs, including premium, 
deductible and co-insurance costs.311  By exempting this population from the 
mandate, the Commonwealth yielded to the reality that reform didn’t 
distribute costs in a way that made insurance affordable for its aging, yet not 
yet Medicare eligible, residents.  This type of problem for older uninsured 
might be even worse under the Health Reform Law, which allows older 
insured to be charged 3 times as much as younger insured.312   
In an attempt to make insurance affordable as broadly as possible, the 
Connector Board authorized deeper subsidies to more individual market 
enrollees than initially projected.313  Doing so increased the overall cost of 
reform in early years and has threatened its stability in light of budgetary 
pressure more recently.314  In response to recent budget cuts, Massachusetts 
limited the scope of subsidized coverage available to 31,000 legal immigrants 
by eliminating dental, hospice, and skilled nursing care and by limiting choice 
of insurer to one managed care company.315  Finally, it has also eliminated 
automatic enrollment into subsidized plans to control costs through natural 
attrition and failure of some residents to enroll.316 
In addition, Massachusetts’s individual market still enables insurers to 
engage in risk selection through product design that steers enrollees to self-
segregate into different products in part of the basis of their own anticipated 
future health.317  Experts are concerned that in this system, low-income 
individual market purchasers of insurance may buy plans with low premiums 
in return for high cost-sharing obligations, which might deter use of medical 
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care or threaten income security if medical care is needed.318  For example, 
plans that meet Massachusetts’s “minimum creditable coverage” requirements 
could have deductibles as high as $2000 for an individual or $4000 for a 
family and out-of-pocket maximums as high as $5000 for individuals and 
$10,000 for families.319  These levels of out-of-pocket spending, similar to 
those allowed in the Health Reform Law,320 could serve as a significant 
deterrent of use of care for many of the families and undercut the mandate’s 
effectiveness toward its goals. 
These limitations of regulatory solutions to address problems of 
fragmentation are perhaps not surprising.321  Because insurers’ profit depends 
on risk selection and segmentation, they have developed numerous practices 
to achieve such ends.322  Historically, insurers have been innovative in finding 
alternative factors to use for risk selection – both legal and illegal – when 
some practices are prohibited.323  For example, insurers can design provider 
networks to attract healthy or sick applicants.324  Insurers have also been 
known to disenroll high-risk insureds (“lemon dropping”) through rigorous 
utilization review, poor service, or even discontinuing a particular policy.325  It 
would be nearly impossible to regulate private markets in all the ways 
necessary to prevent insurers from treating people with different risks 
differentially, as well as to enforce all such regulations.326  Thus, while private 
insurance regulation is a critical element of defragmentation, and one well-
represented in the Health Reform Law, it may be insufficient to maximize the 
mandate’s ability to promote health redistribution. 
C. Restructuring Markets   
While regulatory solutions offer the potential to address some problems of 
defragmentation, particularly within the individual market, solutions that 
dismantle structural barriers to risk pooling – among private markets, among 
public programs, and between public and private markets – could begin to 
melt the boundaries of fragmentation more comprehensively.  There are 
numerous ways to restructure markets towards the goal of reducing 
fragmentation.  This paper does not attempt to examine them all.  Rather, this 
section intends to select out and describe several policies that might result in 
significant structural defragmentation to explore the potential benefit of a 
structural approach.  While the Health Reform Act ventures to a small extent 
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into this space with Medicaid expansions and the creation of state-based 
exchanges for the sale of insurance, these types of solutions are largely beyond 
the scope of the current reform. These structural solutions could, however, 
provide a roadmap for future policies aimed at the next layer of 
defragmentation. 
1. Restructuring Private Markets 
The current boundaries to risk pooling in private markets could be 
softened or broken down in a number of ways over time.  For example, 
individual and small group markets can be combined to provide better risk 
pooling opportunities for the individual market.  Massachusetts’ merger of its 
individual and small group markets in 2006 was credited with lowering 
premium prices for individual market policies about 15 percent, which was 
counterbalanced by a 1-1.5 percent increase in premiums for small group 
plans.327  The Health Reform Law similarly allows states to merge their 
individual and small group markets, beginning in 2014.328  
In conjunction, a health insurance exchange, depending on how designed, 
could both administratively and symbolically blur lines currently drawn by 
insurers between markets.  At the most basic level, exchanges can serve as a 
marketplace to make the purchase of insurance more transparent within the 
bounds of current plans and markets. Yet, an exchange might serve a larger 
risk pooling and defragmentation role if explicitly and carefully designed to do 
so.  An exchange could be designed to enable risk to distribute among all 
exchange enrollees, who might include individuals previously divided among 
individual and group and public and private plans.  In addition, the exchange 
could act as a purchasing pool, where an administrator negotiates lower 
reimbursement rates with providers on the behalf of all enrollees in exchange 
plans (even if these plans are administered by different private insurers).329  
Thus, as more people enroll through an exchange, all members might benefit 
from the increase in scale and bargaining power.  Finally, an exchange could 
also create a symbolic shared identity among all enrollees, who might credit 
the exchange, rather than individual private insurance companies 
administering the policies, with insuring their health.   
Massachusetts’s Connector hosts such a website exchange where 
consumers can compare and enroll in plans, and a similar model of state-
based exchanges is included in the federal Health Reform Law.330  While the 
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Connector has created a more transparent marketplace for individual market 
and small group policies where customers can compare plans side-by-side on 
relevant criteria, many believe it has not seized upon its full potential to 
reduce fragmentation.331  Some argue it has not leveraged its market power to 
negotiate better rates for enrollees; rather, it relies on individual insurers to 
each do so separately.332  This is an issue of particular concern in 
Massachusetts because of the pressure large academic medical centers have 
put on insurers to keep reimbursement rates high, contributing to higher than 
average medical costs in the state.333  Furthermore, the Connector has done 
little to streamline administration or marketing of the different categories of 
plans sold through it.  The subsidized CommCare and nonsubsidized 
CommChoice plans are marketed, sold, designed, administered, and priced 
differently.  And MassHealth, while similar in many ways to the subsidized 
CommCare plans, remains a separate program.  Thus, while exchanges have 
potential to serve goals of defragmentation, they must be intended, and 
carefully designed and implemented, in a way that seizes upon this potential. 
Finally, to break down the barrier between the small group, individual, 
and large group market, a final and bold step would be to begin to dismantle 
the current system of employer-sponsored insurance (“ESI”).  Erosion of ESI 
is typically framed as a concern or potential negative consequence of 
reform.334  In the short term, such concerns may be valid to the extent erosion 
would undercut what is currently the market that best pools risk and offers 
the least expensive, highest value policies.  
Such fear of crowding out ESI leads to reform elements, such as employer 
mandates and the above mentioned reinsurance of policies for 55-65-year-
olds in employer plans, that aim to stabilize ESI.  In Massachusetts’s reform, 
the employer mandate has been largely credited with preventing crowd-out.335  
Massachusetts’s employer mandate is structured as a “pay or play” law, 
requiring employers with more than ten employees to contribute to their 
employees’ health coverage or, alternately, to pay a fine of $295 annually per 
eligible employee.336  This type of law attempts to avoid triggering ERISA 
preemption of state regulation of employee benefits by creating incentives for, 
rather than directly requiring, employer contribution to their employees’ 
health insurance.337  This distinction may be a legal splitting of hairs.  In 
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reality, most rational employers would choose to comply by establishing, 
maintaining, and contributing to an ESI plan, rather than paying the fine.  By 
contributing to ESI, their dollars go further because every dollar is tax 
subsidized and results in a direct benefit for employees.  Employers can thus 
offer employees more value from every dollar spent, which will presumably 
translate into benefits in terms of recruiting and retention.  While employers 
could theoretically choose to spend the same dollars paying a fine, most 
rational businesses would put the dollars toward additional employee 
compensation in the form of an ESI plan. 
While such preservation of ESI through a mandate might be beneficial in 
the short-run, in term of maximizing health redistribution, such preservation 
may be a short-term gain and long-term loss.  Erosion of ESI might in fact be 
beneficial to defragmentation and could in fact be hastened through 
elimination of the tax subsidies for these plans (although such an approach 
would be a significant political feat).  If dollars employers spent on health 
insurance were no longer less expensive than dollars spent on salary, offering 
health insurance – which requires significant administrative investment for 
American firms – might no longer be an appealing way for them to 
compensate their employees.  We might thus see the prevalence of ESI drop 
off significantly.   
In the long-term, such erosion of ESI, including both self-funded and 
fully-funded plans, could eliminate current barriers between individual and 
group insurance.  We could imagine that erosion of plans in the group 
insurance market might result in a system where all Americans would be 
insured in the individual market.338  If everyone were in the individual market, 
                                                                                                                      
enacted but did not implement such mandates (Massachusetts returned to and eventually 
enacted one in 2006, as discussed above).  Shelley K. Hubner, State “Pay or Play” Employer 
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supra, at 18-21.  Hawaii’s was exempted from preemption because it was passed before ERISA.  
Jacobson, supra, at 1175-76.  Currently, the circuits are split on whether this type of plan 
design will survive a preemption challenge, an issue that will possibly be decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court this session.  See generally Borzi, supra note 249 (discussing ERISA 
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338 A number of policy proposals have advocated elimination of ESI.  See, e.g., Research 
and Policy Comm., Comm. for Econ. Dev., Quality, Affordable Health Care for All: 
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and the individual market were regulated in a way that reduced internal 
fragmentation, fairly broad health redistribution would be possible among all 
privately insureds.  Such a system might begin to look structurally more like 
the Dutch or Swiss systems, which experience significant health redistribution 
within a system reliant on private insurers.   
2. Expansion of Existing Public Insurance and the Public Option  
Finally, an alternate route might entail expansion of existing public 
programs or creation of a public plan option to draw a greater proportion of 
Americans, particularly those currently left to the individual market, into 
public health insurance plans.  Such plans, organized around larger social 
goals, could better promote risk pooling and provide higher-value coverage 
more equitably.   
These approaches have received the most resistance when proposed as 
part of reform, in large part because they more aggressively disrupt the 
current private market and public programs.  Some are particularly concerned 
that expansion of public insurance is simply a slippery slope toward a single 
payer system.339  While it would arguably take more than a slippery slope to 
move from our current fragmented public and private insurance markets all 
the way to a single payer system, these types of proposals could significantly 
increase the number of publically insured Americans.  If eligibility for public 
programs is broadened and these programs offer high-quality, high-value 
insurance, it is in fact likely that more people will enroll in them, even if they 
must buy in at “full price.”  If, for example, more people were allowed to buy 
into Medicare, and if Medicare were a more appealing option than private 
insurance, we would expect to see crowd out of private insurance by Medicare.  
Currently, public insurance programs – federal and state – finance 46 percent 
of all health care delivered in the United States.340  If a new public plan were 
added and/or current public programs were expanded, well over half of the 
health costs of our population might be publically financed.  That being said, 
the patchwork of publicly financed insurance would still be far from a single 
payer system. 
There are a number of ways policymakers and scholars have considered 
expanding enrollment in public insurance plans.  The one approach that made 
its way into the federal Health Reform Law is Medicaid expansion, by 
extending eligibility to 133 percent of the FPL and removing categorical 
eligibility restrictions, which currently limit Medicaid eligibility to pregnant 
women, children up to age 19, their parents and caretakers, the disabled, and 
the elderly.341  This approach will not only grow the numbers of beneficiaries 
in Medicaid but will also diversify risk pools by allowing more low-income 
healthy beneficiaries into the program.  Doing so would promote greater 
health redistribution among a somewhat more diverse group of insureds and 
bring down the cost of the program per insured.   
                                                 
339  See, e.g., Tanner, supra note 4, at 1, 7-9 (expressing particular concern with 
individual mandates). 
340 Health Policy Brief: A Public Health Insurance Plan, supra note 41, at 2. 
341 H.R. 3590, supra note 2, § 2001.  See, e.g., Alan R. Weil, Expanding Access Through 
Public Coverage: Permitting Families to Use Tax Credits to Buy into Medicaid or SCHIP, 38 
Inquiry 146 (2001).  
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Over time, we could even imagine consolidating programs like Medicaid 
and SCHIP as the eligibility criterion began to overlap.  The earlier House Bill 
had envisioned such a phasing out of SCHIP over time, where SCHIP 
beneficiaries would have been transitioned either into Medicaid or a new 
public plan option.342  Such streamlining could lead to administrative 
simplification, better risk pooling, and perhaps greater public acceptance of 
the programs.  Enrollment, reimbursement rate negotiation with providers, 
and billing could be consolidated.  Such streamlining would also prevent 
variable access to care for someone having to switch programs and perhaps 
providers as earnings increase, as is now the case for some states that have 
different Medicaid and SCHIP provider networks.   
Consolidation of such programs to encompass a broader range of incomes 
might also positively shift the public perception of these programs as they 
cover not just the stigmatized poor.343  Consider the food stamp program.  As 
recipients of the food stamp program have begun to include not just the poor 
but also the middle class (and in fact currently 1/8 of Americans), the 
perceived value of the program and public support for it have grown.344   
Another approach would be to expand Medicare eligibility to younger 
beneficiaries, who might pay a premium to join early.345 The idea of allowing 
55-65-year-olds to buy in was briefly on the table as part of discussions in the 
Senate towards the end of 2009.346  Since this age group is particularly 
disadvantaged in the individual market, a Medicare buy-in option, even if 
expensive, might be an attractive option for them.  A buy-in would bring 
paying, younger, and presumably healthier-on-average beneficiaries into the 
Medicare program, increasing the program’s ability to promote greater health 
redistribution.  It would also allow the newly enrolled to maintain their same 
coverage as they aged into subsidized Medicare coverage. 
Finally, the public insurance expansion proposal that garnered the most 
attention (and opposition) in reform debates was the creation of a new 
national public plan option to compete with private insurance plans.347  If well 
implemented, a public insurance option could be a platform for greater health 
                                                 
342 H.R. 3962, supra note 2, § 1703. 
343  See generally William Julius Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner 
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redistribution across a diverse population and across state lines if it were able 
to attract a large number of both high and low risk beneficiaries to join.  The 
ability of a public plan to attract both healthy and sick enrollees would rely, in 
particular on at least two factors.  The first is that regulatory requirements 
imposed on private plans must sufficiently prevent them from selecting out 
the healthiest beneficiaries and leaving the highest risk beneficiaries to the 
public plan.  Professor Jacob Hacker, a champion of the public plan option, 
contends that successful implementation of a public plan relies upon applying 
the same rules to public and private plans (e.g., guaranteed issue, community 
rating, minimum benefits rules) and risk adjustment of premiums to deter 
commercial insurers from cherry-picking healthy beneficiaries.348       
The second is whether the public plan will be able to sufficiently control 
costs so that even if it were to enroll higher risk insureds on average, it could 
still offer insurance inexpensively enough to attract healthy enrollees.  
Because a public plan will inevitably attract many higher-risk enrollees who 
have had difficulty obtaining quality private insurance, it must be able to 
counterbalance the higher per person medical costs of such enrollees to 
remain a compelling alternative to private insurance. There is reason to 
believe a public plan could do so  by operating with lower administrative 
costs,349 by managing cost growth, and because it does not extract profits for 
shareholders.350  Studies also suggest a public plan may also be more 
successful at controlling costs through negotiating lower reimbursement rates 
for medical care than private insurers have been, as has occurred with 
Medicare and Medicaid, so long as it is able to insure enough enrollees to 
accrue sufficient bargaining power.351  Finally, a large public plan might 
provide an opportunity for experimentation with improved methods for 
health care utilization and costs.352  Despite the perceptions to the contrary, 
Medicare may be more effective than private insurers at restraining excessive 
cost growth.353 
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Even with these potential means to manage costs, it is possible the public 
plan may not be able to counterbalance the number of higher-than-average-
risk enrollees it attracts and would itself create greater fragmentation.  If the 
public plan enrolls the highest-risk Americans, it would enable private pools 
to grow healthier on average.  The public plan could in essence default into a 
high-risk pool and exacerbate fragmentation by further limiting risk pooling 
among healthy and sick, with the healthier Americans in private insurance 
and sicker Americans in public insurance. 
Although the possibility exists that a public option defaults into a high-
risk pool, the fact that proposals for a public option ignited strong insurance 
industry resistance and were eventually defeated suggests its likely ability to 
compete for both sick and healthy enrollees.  To the extent the public plan 
attracts a large number of both healthy and sick beneficiaries, and especially 
to the extent it is permitted to draw new enrollees from all of the existing sub-
markets (individual, small group and large group), it could facilitate 
considerably broad health redistribution.  It could also provide more equitable 
access to insurance for enrollees who would have otherwise struggled to find 
the same in the individual market. 
Finally, it’s possible a national, coherently defined public plan could 
generate a sense of group salience among a heterogeneous mix of insured.354  
Once people belong to a shared public plan, they may develop identification 
with being a member of the plan.  Even if they don’t extract in benefits as 
much as they contribute each year in premiums, enrollees might appreciate 
having a safety net of high quality coverage that wasn’t previously available 
through the private market.  If such a sense of group salience and loyalty to 
the public plan were to develop, it might increase the likelihood of the 
political sustainability of the plan.355  
D. Defragmentation and Building Solidarity  
What is the power of lessening the lines of fragmentation while 
mandating all Americans carry insurance?  Is it simply about short-term 
health redistribution and who shoulders more of the weight of universal 
health care reform?  Or, as scholars have suggested, is there more at stake?  Is 
it possible that where lines are drawn actually constructs notions of who is 
willing to share risk with whom?  Might broadly redefining the institutional 
structure of who will share risk with whom help to shape American’s 
conceptions about who should share risk with whom?  While answering these 
questions is beyond the scope of this paper, asking them highlights what 
might be at stake with continued efforts at defragmentation as the Health 
Reform Law is implemented over the next decade. 
We have seen acculturation over time in our current health insurance 
system.  The individualization of risk in the private insurance market – a fairly 
recent phenomenon that developed through the rise of actuarial rating in the 
mid-twentieth century – has created a deeply embedded notion that private 
health insurance is all about individual risk.  Part of American insurance 
culture is “fair” pricing, which has been redefined as actuarially fair pricing.   
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The different approaches discussed above to addressing fragmentation 
will each result in a different degree and type of defragmentation, and 
different pictures of risk pooling.  The regulatory solutions can shift the 
individual, private market back toward a model of collectivized risks, rather 
than one that seeks to individualize risk through risk classification and 
selection.  Restructuring private and public markets might more 
fundamentally redefine and broaden current boundaries of risk pooling 
among different private insurance markets, including eliminating the 
distinction between individual and group insurance, and between public and 
private markets.   
The policies for defragmentation that accompany a mandate might define 
future American conceptions about what degree and types of risk pooling are 
appropriate and beneficial.  By changing the baseline, norms and conceptions 
of risk pooling might change over time.  If both the current Health Reform 
Law and future efforts broaden risk pools while maintaining, and perhaps 
expanding, access to quality medical care for Americans, Americans might 
grow in their support of programs that rest on broad risk pooling, as was the 
case for both Medicare and Social Security.  Americans might learn that 
programs of broad health redistribution are not only less painful than 
imagined but perhaps largely beneficial.  The twenty-five-year-old who resists 
buying insurance today might come to see that his participation today is a 
critical element in creation of a social norm of broad risk pooling and that this 
norm will make premiums affordable for him when he grows older.   
In addition, the structure of the programs themselves might lessen future 
barriers to health redistribution, by actuating altruism among members of the 
program, as discussed earlier in the context of Gillian Lester’s work.356  For 
example, by grouping people together into more heterogeneously, cohesively 
designed insurance markets and programs, it might be possible to shift the 
notions of who should share risk with whom.357  Americans might begin to 
understand structures that facilitate mutual security with respect to health 
risks as valuable reciprocal endeavors and perhaps begin to feel commonality 
through membership in such a program with a more broadly defined group of 
enrollees.  It is possible this sense of commonality would translate into a 
willingness to support a program that serves to ensure access to medical care 
for a broad population.    
During the current political debates, the actions of Medicare beneficiaries 
provide the perfect illustration of the power of how we initially define 
communities of shared risk.358  The resistance to reform by current Medicare 
beneficiaries led to ironic cries at town hall meetings of “keep your 
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government hands off my Medicare,”359 in protest to expansion of public 
insurance. This resistance by Medicare beneficiaries to reform is perfectly 
illustrative of the power of line drawing.  Before Medicare, seniors shared 
little in common with respect to their health risks, apart from a higher 
likelihood of both needing medical care and finding it difficult to obtain 
insurance.  With Medicare, the government decided to pool risk among all 
seniors, creating a program where they would contribute while working for 
the opportunity to draw benefits once retired.  Within this program, seniors 
don’t typically object to the fact that they are pooling risk with other seniors, 
even through some are considerably sicker than others.  But they are fiercely 
resistant to changes that might begin to soften the boundaries of “Medicare 
beneficiary” as currently (and somewhat arbitrarily) defined and thus force 
them to share risk with others.  While this fierce loyalty is a bane to current 
reform, it shows the power of creating a group identity by how we draw the 
lines around a risk pool or a health insurance program.  Medicare might speak 
to the promise of generating broader notions of solidarity over time if 
membership lines are drawn more broadly.   
Are there limits to how broadly we can draw lines and maintain solidarity 
among insureds?  In her recent work, Nan Hunter has argued that employer 
groups might actually provide an ideal structure on which to develop 
collaborative processes for making decisions about risk allocation.360  
Coworkers are a group with a previously shared identity and whose wellbeing 
is tied to each other through the employer’s success.  It’s also possible that 
people with identifiably similar characteristics, such as the elderly or veterans, 
can more naturally cohere into groups and programs of mutual assistance.  
However, the solidarity underlying health insurance systems built upon broad, 
heterogeneous, and typically non-employment-related risk pools in all other 
industrialized nations suggests that it might be possible to draw the lines of 
inclusion and participation much more broadly and maintain, and even 
perhaps grow, an underlying ethic of mutual aid. 
 Thus, what is at stake in decisions about continued efforts at 
defragmentation might be both the ability of the individual mandate to affect 
health redistribution and also the American perception of how much health 
redistribution and mutual aid is desirable for a society.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
While often held up as a key to insurance market efficiency, the individual 
mandate has potential to do more.  There are at least three visions of what the 
mandate might accomplish that have threaded through popular, political, and 
scholarly discussions of the mandate.  In this paper, I have characterized them 
as paternalist, efficiency, and redistributive objectives. 
For many, support for the individual mandate arises in part out of its 
ability to promote health redistribution in a climate where doing so through a 
single payer system is politically unlikely.  They see the mandate as a tool to 
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distribute the costs of medical care more broadly by compelling the healthy or 
lucky into risk pools with the sick or unlucky. The mandate’s ability to 
promote health redistribution in this way can unlock some of the benefits 
Americans hope will result from health reform.  In particular, many look to 
reform to create a world where all Americans can see a doctor or go to the 
hospital when they are in need, regardless of their past health problems or 
limited means – a vision the mandate can support best if it promotes broad 
health redistribution.   
Yet, fragmentation of American insurance markets aims to individualize 
risk in a way that will thwart the mandate’s effectiveness on this front.  This is 
because health redistribution relies on the mandate’s ability not only to 
increase coverage but also to draw the healthy into risk pools with the sick so 
that within these risk pools they help finance care for those sicker or less lucky 
than themselves.  Fragmented insurance markets prevent such risk pooling in 
structural ways – by dividing up insureds into separate public and private 
markets – and through the use of risk classification and selection processes 
that distribute risk unevenly and inequitably among insureds within each 
market.   
If an individual mandate is to serve the objective of health redistribution, 
it must be implemented in conjunction with policy reforms that reduce 
fragmentation in markets.  The Health Reform Law takes important first 
steps at defragmentation by regulating the private insurance markets to 
prevent fragmentation within these markets.  Additional, more fundamental 
and structural efforts at defragmentation are left, however, to future reform 
efforts.   
The degree of defragmentation undertaken is important in the short term 
and the long term.  In the short-term, defragmentation will more evenly 
distribute the costs of health reform among all Americans – healthy and sick.  
In the long term, the degree of defragmentation (or the level of risk pooling or 
collectivization) might in fact help shape Americans’ views about the 
appropriate level of risk pooling.  If a mandate compels Americans to join a 
health insurance system that, by spreading risk broadly, is better able to 
provide everyone with access to care when in need, this redistributive system 
might over time be seen as serving a socially important role.  Americans might 
grow to tolerate, appreciate, and perhaps even identify deeply with 
membership in such a program, legitimizing the health redistribution that 
occurs within.  If redrawing the lines of where risk is pooled could serve this 
legitimizing function, defragmentation may be critical not only for the 
mandate’s short-term success but perhaps also for the long-term sustainability 
of health reform build upon an individual mandate. 
